

Tanja Saariaho

DOMESTICATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Epistemic Struggles over the UN Global Compact for
Migration in Australia and New Zealand

Faculty of Social Sciences

Master's Thesis

October 2020

ABSTRACT

Tanja Saariaho: Domesticating International Agreements: Epistemic Struggles over the UN Global Compact for Migration in Australia and New Zealand.

Master's Thesis

Tampere University

Master's Degree in Global and Transnational Sociology

October 2020

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how national negotiation processes through which a world model becomes domesticated into local contexts unfold at the level of value-based rhetoric. As a case in point, this thesis examines how the United Nations (UN) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) has been domesticated in the national contexts of two traditional migrant-receiving states, Australia and New Zealand. The focus is on the initial stages of domestication, and on the values and moral principles that actors used in their argumentation about the desirability of adopting the compact.

The data used in this thesis included the GCM-related reporting, interviews, and debates in the mass news media in Australia and New Zealand. The method of data analysis was rhetorical analysis. This thesis examined how different actors argued for or against the GCM, as well as the distinct values and moral principles evoked, whilst actors sought to safeguard their own distinct political interests in the domestic migration debate. The chosen sources of data were the newspaper *The Australian*, and the news websites 9news.com.au, news.com.au, and abc.net.au for Australia. In the context of New Zealand, the data were derived from the newspaper *NZ Herald*, and the news websites stuff.co.nz, newshub.co.nz, and tvnz.co.nz. Altogether, 62 different news sources were included in the dataset.

The findings show that different actors shared similar values and moral principles which they used differently to strengthen their arguments. At the same time, some actors struggled to appear as legitimate at the crossroads of various world cultural values. The common values often referred to by different speakers included state sovereignty, national identity, rationality, accountability, compassion, and universal human rights. Overall, the findings evince that even though different actors agree on the principles under which migration should be governed, they disagree on how these principles should be actualized, because they encounter contradictory world cultural values that are highly institutionalized around the globe. Differences in local sociopolitical realities influence whether, and to what extent, the migration compact becomes decoupled in practice, explicating why the GCM was adopted in New Zealand but not in Australia.

Keywords: migration governance, international agreements, GCM, sociological institutionalism, domestication theory, values in rhetoric, rhetorical analysis, Australia, New Zealand

The originality of this thesis has been checked using the Turnitin OriginalityCheck service.

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List of Abbreviations Used

GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
UN	The United Nations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ILO	International Labour Organization
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
OHCHR	United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

1. Introduction

As the World Migration Report 2018 by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) states, “The prominence of migration as a public policy issue and newsworthy topic has perhaps never been more pronounced” (2017, 1). This statement refers to recent large population movements, such as the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe. In 2015, over a million persons sought refuge from European states (IOM 2016, 5). Other large population movements from recent years, such as migration from South American states towards the US-Mexican border, or the fleeing of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, have kept migration a prominent topic in headlines around the world.

As a response to vast population movements, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants on 19 September 2016. The declaration commenced the production of two global compacts: one to address the causes and needs of refugee situations and the other to address migration in its other, diverse forms. The latter became known as the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). This compact is the first inter-governmentally created framework aimed at establishing a set of common global standards for governing migration.

After over a year of negotiations, the global compact for migration was adopted in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 10-11 December 2018. However, it received some notable opposition along the process. In December 2017, the Trump administration withdrew from the negotiations, declaring that the compact posed a threat to national sovereignty and was incompatible with the US immigration policies (Wintour, The Guardian, December 3, 2017). Other countries have also expressed similar concerns, and some have followed suit. For example, Hungary, Israel, Australia, Brazil, Poland, and Chile have all withdrawn from supporting the compact.

As the migration compact is not legally binding, states adopting it could decide in which ways to implement it. The emerged criticism and domestic debates, even in countries that finally chose to endorse the compact¹, indicate that a symbolic dimension of the GCM as a politically rather than a legally binding framework became prominent. Such contestation, however, is not unique in the field of migration governance. The lack of a coherent multilateral framework for global migration governance has been an indicator of stark disagreements between different actors on the field (Koser 2010).

¹ In Belgium, for example, the government collapsed over disagreements regarding the GCM. The Belgian prime minister participated in the GCM adoption ceremony in Morocco, December 2018, as a representative of a minority government. (Bradshaw, 2018. Flanders Today, December 10. <http://www.flandertoday.eu/minority-government-continue-n-v-a-switches-opposition>)

As noted by Newland (2010, 336), discussions about international cooperation in migration governance mostly center on a shared institutional setting; specifically, how a common global governance architecture for migration governance should look like. As she continues to observe, without a global consensus on how to govern migration, such discussions will prove insufficient, leading to much talk without action (ibid., 336-337). The Global Compact for Migration could be seen as a form of a 'global consensus' on migration governance, agreed upon by the majority of the UN Member States. However, the emerged domestic opposition against the compact hinders its implementation. Focusing too narrowly on the 'global' level of governance poses the risk of neglecting the relevance of domestic realities which influence how global models and ideas materialize in practice.

This thesis focuses on the UN Global Compact for Migration and the local, national media discourses surrounding it. The applied focus has a bottom-up perspective, centering on the interplay between the 'global' and the 'local' in the domestic context. In particular, this thesis aims to address the following issue: if modern nation-states agree on the main values under which migration should be governed, i.e. state sovereignty and human rights as proclaimed in the Global Compact for Migration, then how is it possible that the compact, as a legally non-binding framework, became so contested? To approach this question empirically, this thesis will focus on national GCM debates in two countries: Australia and New Zealand. The chosen data is derived from the mass news media sources in both countries. What makes them interesting for a case study are the different decisions their governments reached with the compact, and the fact that both countries are located far from where the national GCM controversies originated from; mainly, the USA and Europe.

In New Zealand, the compact caused opposition due to views that ascribe the GCM with undesired local consequences, such as placing limitations to domestic immigration policymaking for future governments (Devlin, stuff.co.nz, December 4, 2018). Due to a pending government decision, New Zealand did not participate in the adoption ceremony of the GCM in Morocco in December 2018. The government finally sought legal advice from the Crown Law Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade before making a decision in support of official endorsement (Ensor, newshub.co.nz, December 19, 2018).

Australia is located close to New Zealand but its encounter with the GCM had a different result. Soon after the final draft of the compact was published, the Australian Government stated it could not support it "in its current form" (Sherrell, Parliament of Australia, March 15, 2019). On 21 November 2018, the Australian government announced its withdrawal from the compact. In a joint statement articulated by the Australian Prime Minister, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs, the decision was established on the grounds that the compact was "inconsistent" with

Australia's "well-established policies and not in Australia's interest" (Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, November 21, 2018).

Taking a sociological neo-institutional stance, an approach known as the world culture theory (Boli and Thomas 1997) posits that actors are part of a larger world polity, behaving according to what is considered rational and normative as reflected in the principles instituted into globally shared cognitive conceptions. This thesis acknowledges the importance of world cultural principles such as universalism and rationality (ibid.) in guiding much of states' decision-making. Particularly, the world culture approach places heavy weight on intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that establish and amplify scripts for good behavior in a world society (Meyer 2009, 44). Because of a common world culture, ideas and models that promulgate what is desirable and appropriate – norms and scripts consolidated through the structures of a rationalized world order – spread to all corners of the globe (ibid., 54-55). This diffusion of world models motivated by external legitimization may eventually lead to a decoupling between formal commitments and their actual outcomes. Following a "logic of appropriateness", actors might engage in adopting policies simply because "developing institutional isomorphism increases their legitimacy, their access to resources and therefore their survival capabilities." (Jetschke and Rüland 2009, 183.) In other words, there are external rewards for adopting globally institutionalized norms, motivating actors to do so even when they lack the will or capacity to implement them.

Most studies on decoupling approach their research problem from a macro-level perspective (Austen and Kapias 2016, 228). Within traditional world culture research, investigations also typically focus quantitatively on the conditions that seem to explicate the diffusion of world models (see, for example, Strand and Meyer 1993; Bromley 2004; Fernández and Lutter 2013; Wang and Schofer 2018). Although the world culture approach provides a plausible picture for explicating the phenomenon of institutional isomorphism in the world, it fails to explain in more detail the local dynamics that shape local responses to global trends. Its traditionally macro-focused approach has paid little attention to domestic processes of policy adaptation. (Qadir 2014, 149.)

A theoretical approach called domestication of global trends (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014) contributes to the picture by providing a framework for analyzing what actually happens on the local contexts as world models spread to different parts of the globe. The domestication framework examines how global models are made locally sensible by means of establishing a national interest around an exogenous model (Alasuutari and Qadir 2019, 110). Following this line, this thesis investigates domestic GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand with the attempt of ascertaining how the compact was made locally sensible. The research questions this thesis aims to answer are the following: (1) How have actors in domestic GCM discourses argued about the UN migration compact in Australia and New Zealand whilst potentially safeguarding their own distinct political interests?

(2) Which values and moral principles have been evoked by these arguments; i.e. what kind of moral rhetoric have different actors viewed as resonating with their local publics?

Firstly, this thesis will contribute to research on decoupling in the world polity. The world culture approach has particularly noticed the decoupling occurring in the developing world: "...ritualized enactment of global models may be only loosely related to policy implementation – especially in impoverished countries" (Schofer et al. 2012, 60). However, the cases brought to light under this thesis – Australia and New Zealand – represent industrialized states with the appropriate resources for implementing global models such as the UN migration compact. Their initial stages of domesticating the compact will widen our understanding about the processes involved in the phenomenon of decoupling.

Secondly, this thesis will add to an evolving research conducted on the domestication of world models. Domestication studies have typically focused on ideas and models deemed successful by national governments, leading to their wide geographical proliferation and standardized enactment in local contexts (see, for example, Büttner 2014; Syväterä 2016; Alasuutari and Kangas 2020). The GCM, by contrast, has become a controversial framework whose global origin is not 'forgotten' in national debates but is specifically used as a rhetorical tactic by critiques in their justifications against it. Even though the compact has wide global adoption rate, some powerful states in world politics brought it into negative light and affected public perceptions about the desirability of the GCM. Furthermore, the origin of the GCM is not entirely 'exogenous' to the domestic level as state representatives themselves have actively negotiated the compact under the UN framework. Therefore, the GCM represents an interesting case for domestication research. Finally, there is a lack of investigation on how actors articulate their motivations for the domestic adoption of world models (Alasuutari 2013, 39). Overall, this study sheds more light to the dynamics present within world culture by examining domestic negotiation processes by which a model becomes locally accepted or rejected.

The data used for this study derives from the GCM-related statements in the mass news media of New Zealand and Australia. The data consists of news articles, opinion pieces and audio data from interviews and debates published in widely read newspapers and news websites. Parliamentary data was ruled out since the GCM has not been debated in the Australian parliament. Attention is directed to the ways in which actors presented the relevance of the compact to their national audiences.

As the GCM is a highly value-laden document, the focus of the data analysis is on the references that actors made to different values and moral principles in their argumentation. Values are also a central rhetorical asset, used by actors who wish to persuade others into accepting a certain viewpoint. Cultural values are also at the core of world culture theory; thus, it is insightful to

investigate how values are used when encountering a new world model which causes conflicting opinions and public questioning on the local level.

The thesis begins with an overview of current global trends in international migration and global migration governance. Then the process of creating the UN Global Compact for Migration will be described. Some further background will be added by elaborating on the role of non-legally binding agreements in global governance, followed by an overview of Australia's and New Zealand's migration policies and their encounter with the GCM. The methodology of the thesis will also be presented in more detail. I will then proceed to describe the processes of data collection and analysis. Finally, the thesis will conclude with a discussion of the potential implications of the results and possible directions for future research.

2. Background

This chapter provides an overview of the background contexts for the study. The current situation of international migration will be compactly portrayed, followed by a literature review of global migration governance and the role of non-legally binding instruments in governance. Finally, the domestic contexts of Australia and New Zealand will be introduced in terms of migration and how these states interacted with the UN migration compact.

2.1. International Migration: Trends & Figures

Human mobility is not a new phenomenon. For centuries, people have transgressed regions, shaping the course of history. What characterizes human mobility in the context of modern-day globalization is the intensification of movement, as Scholte (2008, 1479) depicts: "More people, more often and more intensely engage with the planetary arena as a single social place." Several factors, including changes in communication and transport technologies have contributed to such intensification, rendering international migration a "central dynamic in globalization" (Castles et al. 2009, 2-3). What is also novel in the contemporary world-order is the way in which the globe is divided into clearly demarcated nation-states with secured borders. For example, the creation and the use of passports to supervise movement across national borders is a fairly recent invention (Yuval-Davis 2002, 46).

As noted by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), there is no universal consensus on the definition of an international migrant (OHCHR 2014, 4). The OHCHR has used a definition by which an international migrant is "any person who is outside a State of which he or she is a citizen or national, or, in the case of a stateless person, his or her State of birth or habitual residence" (ibid.). This definition includes long-term and temporary, as well as

documented and undocumented migration (ibid.). In other words, international migration refers to the “movement of persons away from their place of usual residence and across an international border to a country of which they are not nationals” (IOM 2019b, 113).

A typical way to discuss migration is to use the concept of push and pull factors. Push factors drive individuals and households to move and are usually linked to societal deprivations such as economic poverty and unemployment. Pull factors are what makes a certain country seem as an attractive destination for migrants, such as better employment opportunities. Yet, these factors explain international migration only partially; despite their existence many people do not migrate. (Sassen 2007, 130-131.) As a multifaceted phenomenon migration cannot be reduced to an issue of merely push and pull factors.

According to UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs' (UN DESA) estimations and statistics, the proportionate number of international migrants from the world population between 2000 and 2019 has remained relatively stable, at an approximate rate of 3%. The current figure is estimated at a 3.5%, with the total number of international migrants at almost 272 million across the world. Over half of all international migrants, a figure of 82 million, reside in Europe. The second largest continent to receive international migrants is Northern America with 59 million migrant residents, followed by Northern Africa and Western Asia with 49 million migrants. (UN DESA 2019.)




Diagram 1. International migrants by SDG region, 2000 and 2019 (millions). Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2019. *International Migration 2019: Wall Chart* (ST/ESA/SER/A/431). Accessed 1 January 2020. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/wallchart/docs/MigrationStock2019_Wallchart.pdf

Although there has been a clear increase in the number of international migrants across the world during the past 20 years, with the proportionate number of international migrants from the total world population having slightly risen, international migration remains an exceptionality in population trends. Most people do not migrate to live in another country. A decision to move abroad is most

commonly motivated by labor opportunities, love and studying. Humanitarian reasons due to natural disasters and armed conflicts, for example, may also compel people to leave their homes. Displaced migrants are vulnerable people who comprise a minority group among all international migrants. (IOM 2019a.)

Most international migrants are concentrated in 20 countries. The United States of America receives most international migrants in the world. Other popular destination countries include Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, it is commonplace for international migration to occur within the confines of the same region. For example, migration in the sub-Saharan Africa, in different parts of Asia and in Europe occur mostly between countries in the same region. (UN DESA 2019.)

Humanitarian migration receives much media attention, but as a form of migration it persists on the margins. An estimation of 10.6% of all international migrants are either refugees or asylum seekers. Most of them reside in different parts of Africa and Asia. When looking at all of the world's asylum seekers and refugees, 4.4% reside in Europe, 1.9% in Northern America and 1.2% in Oceania. (UN DESA 2019.) In 2018, asylum applications decreased by 34% in OECD countries when compared to the record-breaking figures of 2015 and 2016. As humanitarian migration to OECD countries has decreased after 2016, labor migration has been on the rise. (OECD 2019.)

2.2. The Global Governance of Migration

Although migration is not a new phenomenon, the world was still lacking a coherent multilateral structure for governing international migration at the beginning of 2010's (Betts 2011, 1). This is in stark contrast with the global trend of regulating various areas of social life through the establishment of robust international institutions. The migration-related policy fields that have been most commonly regulated via transnational coordination have been labor rights and the displacement of refugees. (Kunz et al. 2011, 1.) Despite its longstanding occurrence in human history, migration has only recently become more agreed upon as a policy field in need of improved cross-border cooperation on a global scale.

Betts and Kainz (2017, 1) have described global migration governance as “the norms and organizational structures that regulate and facilitate states’ and other actors’ responses to migration.” Through cooperation that extends across national borders, states are perceived to obtain more benefits as opposed to them facing challenges related to migration alone (ibid.). Yet, hitherto, efforts to establish multilateral frameworks to govern international migration have been arduous. A case in point is the 1990 UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members

of Their Families. It came into effect only in 2003. Thus far, the convention has 55 parties, most of which do not represent any major migrant-receiving countries.

Reasons commonly stated for the lack of coherent multilateral governance structures for international migration include apparent differences of interests between 'migrant-sending' and 'migrant-receiving' states, and the notion of state sovereignty; migration is largely regarded as an issue pertinent to domestic policy-making (Legomsky 2009; Kunz et al. 2011). States are generally seen as unwilling to wield some of their decision-making power to the supranational level, specifically when it comes to the right to determine who may enter the national territory, and on what grounds they are allowed to stay and enjoy public services. Additionally, the fragmentation of global migration governance could be explained by the complex, multidimensional profile of international migration which influences several societal sectors from employment, welfare, and social security issues to political, health, educational and cultural aspects of social life (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2015, 140).

Despite the lack of a multilateral governance architecture, many existing frameworks already govern migration across national borders. This manifests in various bilateral agreements, regional frameworks, and transregional forms of cooperation, all of which form a scattered picture of what Kunz et al. (2011, 2) refer to as "islands of migration governance". Some of these governance arrangements deal with only very specific areas of migration, but there has also been an identifiable trend of formulating frameworks that are more inclusive of various migration-related dimensions (ibid.). The UN Global Compact for Migration is a clear example of such trend. Although migration has been on the UN agenda for many years, stagnation of major progress has prevailed until the recent developments set forth by the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016; it would seem that the Syrian conflict has catapulted such acceleration of political will on the topic (Roele 2017, 14).

When trying to apprehend why governing international migration is so contested, two aspects are usually highlighted: human rights and state sovereignty. State sovereignty involves "the right to protect borders, to confer nationality, to admit and expel foreigners, to combat trafficking and smuggling and to safeguard national security", and the principles of safeguarding human rights derive from various legislations such as the refugee law, the criminal law and humanitarian law (IOM, "About Migration Law", n.d.). Crépeau et al. (2007) discuss the contradiction between these two aspects, described by them as the human rights paradigm and the security paradigm. They focus on the juxtaposition between the two. As a result, the authors present that there is a paradoxical phenomenon: universal human rights have been formally adopted and accepted in many corners of the world, and yet, many states also make it hard for persons fleeing persecution and societal unrest to seek protection from their territory. (ibid., 331.)

Overall, the global governance of international migration has been characterized as the “missing regime” (Ghosh 2000; cited in Robinson 2018, 419) with its scattered governance architecture resembling that of a patchwork. The recent developments under the UN framework seem to reflect a turn of tide in the way international migration and its governance are perceived. The Global Compact for Migration is a step toward a commitment to build collective standards and practices for the global cooperation of migration governance, designating the compact with symbolic significance.

2.3. The United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

On 19 September 2016, the UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. The declaration was received with concerted support from the Member States. In the declaration, the Member States acknowledge the need for global solidarity and the development of governance practices regarding cross-border migrations in their diverse forms. (UNHCR, n.d., “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.”)

The New York Declaration was the result of a UN High-level Meeting on large scale movements of refugees and migrants in 2016. The High-level Meeting convened as a response to recent global crises that had resulted into large-scale movements of refugees and migrants (OHCHR, n.d., “Protecting the human rights of migrants and refugees within large movements”). Following the New York Declaration, the birth of two new global compacts was agreed upon: a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly, and regular migration.

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) is the first inter-governmentally established framework agreed upon under the UN, with the aim of building a holistic, common platform for global collaboration in migration governance. The negotiations to formulate the compact were led by the Member States, but the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on International Migration and the IOM also took an active part in the process. Additionally, migrants and other key stakeholders were heard in the creation of the compact, including third and private sector actors and scientific authorities. (Migration Data Portal 2019.)

In the compact, it is stated that it is “a milestone in the history of the global dialogue and international cooperation on migration” and that it “fosters international cooperation among all relevant actors on migration, acknowledging that no State can address migration alone, and upholds the sovereignty of States and their obligations under international law” (p. 2). The compact is not legally binding; rather, it is described as a “cooperative framework” (ibid.). It is based on the following 23 objectives (ibid., 5-6):

1. Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies
2. Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin
3. Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration
4. Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation
5. Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration
6. Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work
7. Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration
8. Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants
9. Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants
10. Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration
11. Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner
12. Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral
13. Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives
14. Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle
15. Provide access to basic services for migrants
16. Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion
17. Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration
18. Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and Competences
19. Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries
20. Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants
21. Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration
22. Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits
23. Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration

The first phase of consultations took place in 2017. Several sessions were held to compile contributions and recommendations from various stakeholders, and a preparatory stocktaking meeting was organized in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in December 2017. These set the basis for inter-governmental negotiations, which finally led to the release of the final draft of the compact on July 11, 2018. Alongside the 23 objectives set in the compact, the framework lists a diverse range of recommendations for policy-making and governance practices to facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration. (Migration Data Portal 2019.)

Member states ceremonially adopted the compact in Marrakesh, Morocco, during a UN conference on migration on December 10-11, 2018. Although support for the creation of the GCM was initially unanimous among the UN Member States, the GCM process did not proceed without controversies. According to a POLITICO article, the UN human rights commissioner Louise Arbour commented that the controversies sparked by the GCM showed “a clear ‘disconnect’ between some countries’ foreign policies ‘and domestic pressures or national concerns that were not included into the process’ ” (POLITICO, November 30, 2018). The United States was the first country to withdraw from the compact as the Trump administration declared that it would not continue to participate in December 2017. The following year, the compact became an object of increasing criticism, with Hungary becoming the second country to officially withdraw in July 2018. Some countries decided to abstain themselves from voting for or against the compact in the UN, pending parliamentary decisions on the matter. Altogether, five countries voted against it in UN General Assembly on December 19, 2018: The United States, Hungary, Israel, Czech Republic, and Poland. In Belgium, the government collapsed over disagreements regarding the GCM. Collective to the domestic oppositions were the claims that migration-related policymaking could not be delineated on a supranational, global level, and that ultimately, the compact undermines state sovereignty with regards to migration governance.

The choice to name the GCM a ‘compact’ is illustrative of the incendiary nature of global migration policymaking. In the words of Gammeltoft-Hansen et al. (2017, 4): “there is little clarity on exactly what kind of international agreement a compact is, and where it sits in relation to existing instruments of international law and international relations.” Roele (2017, 11) proposes that the choice for entitling the document a ‘compact’ might have been motivated by the scarce usage of the term; it renders it free from specific preconceptions. Panizzon (2017, 22) labels compacts as “hybrid” with regards to their “legal density”: they are vaguely situated somewhere between binding agreements and softer instruments. It would seem that the choice to name the GCM a compact reflects a calculated decision; the framework needs to be politically flexible and sensitive to heterogeneous realities in order to make it acceptable and applicable among the diversity of the UN Member States.

2.4. Migration in Australia and New Zealand: Policies and the GCM

Australia and New Zealand have been traditional destination countries for immigration. In Australia, around 28% of its population was foreign-born in 2018 (Inglis 2018). One of the adding factors to Australia's cultural diversity is the fact that the country is among the major states to resettle refugees; only the USA and Canada resettle more refugees than Australia. (ibid.) New Zealand has also been shaped by migration – it is commonly referred to as a “country of immigrants” (Bedford 2003).

When it comes to migration in Australia, the country's border protection policies often appear on the surface. In particular, Australia's offshore detention policies have caused controversy throughout the years. Since 1992, Australia has had mandatory detention to all asylum seekers for the time of processing of their asylum claims. The Australian government maintains off-shore detention centers on the islands of Nauru and Manus Island in Papua New Guinea. These detention centers have their roots in the Tampa incident from 2001, during which a Norwegian freighter called ‘MV Tampa’ rescued hundreds of asylum seekers from the Indian Ocean. It tried to bring them to Australia's Christmas Island, but was denied permission to come on shore. Eventually, the rescued persons were transferred to a detention center on the island-nation of Nauru under an arrangement known as the “Pacific Solution”: in exchange of taking in the asylum seekers, Australia offered a manifold increase in its development aid to Nauru. (Foulkes 2012.)

Australia's off-shore detention policies have received criticism from both local as well as the global community. However, the Australian government has maintained pride over its immigration policies, granting off-shore processing and mandatory detention credit for making control of irregular migration more manageable and efficient. (Inglis 2018.) In general, there is strong public support in Australia for the current detention policies, including mandatory detention to everyone arriving without a visa, and the maintenance of offshore detention centers (Markus and Arunachalam 2018, 438). Overall, attitudes to immigration in Australia portray that the majority supports the ample intake of migrants and refugees, but there is clear opposition against undocumented migrants arriving by boat (ibid., p. 446). The policy of strong border protection is maintained, in particular, by Operation Sovereign Borders, established by the Australian Government in 2013. On the website of Operation Sovereign Borders, it is explained that:

“Anyone who attempts an unauthorised boat voyage to Australia will be turned back to their point of departure, returned to their home country or transferred to another country. No-one who travels illegally to Australia by boat will be allowed to remain in Australia. Australia's tough border protection policies are designed to protect Australia's borders, combat people smuggling and deter people from attempting dangerous boat voyages across the open ocean.” (The Australian Government, n.d.)

One popular point in the migration debate in Australia centers on the topic of congestion in the largest cities, sparking discussions of how to attract migrants to move to regions to release the pressure on city infrastructures. This debate has unfolded in the context of Australia's rapidly growing population. (*The Australian*, August 30, 2018; *The Australian*, October 4, 2019.) According to a report by the Australian National University (Biddle 2019, 2), the trend of Australia's population growth from recent years is largely due to positive net migration. In March 2019, the government confirmed it was planning to reduce the annual intake of permanent migrants to Australia as means to address the congestion in major cities of Sydney and Melbourne (*The Australian*, March 19, 2019).

In terms of the UN Global Compact for Migration, Australia withdrew from it on 21 November 2018. In a joint media release by the Australian Prime Minister, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Foreign Affairs, the compact was described as not adding anything useful to the already existing migration policies: "The rest of the world looks to Australia as an example of how to effectively manage borders and run a successful migration and humanitarian program. That's why when we are asked to sign up to international agreements that we believe will compromise our successful way of doing things, we will pass." (Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, November 21, 2018). The statement also criticizes the GCM for not differentiating between legal and illegal migration, and for having the potential to be used as leverage by those "who have sought to undermine Australia's strong border protection laws and practices" (ibid.). According to a news article by *The Australian* (July 24, 2018), the immigration and border protection spokesman of the opposition party Labor stated that the decision regarding the GCM was solely an issue to be determined by the government. The GCM was not debated in the Australian parliament (*The Australian*, July 28, 2018).

Immigration has also left an imprint on the demographic composition of New Zealand. In 2001, it was recorded that the proportion of overseas born people in New Zealand - nearly 20% at that time - was among the highest of OECD countries, just behind Australia, Canada, and the United States (Bedford 2003). Currently, the figures of net migration gain have once again increased after several years of notable emigration, and there has been a consistent period of higher net migration to New Zealand in recent years (Stats NZ Tatauranga Aotearoa, October 30, 2019).

Distinctive to New Zealand's internal debates concerning cultural diversity is the question of a bicultural society; a cohabiting nation including the Māori (indigenous) and non-Māori inhabitants. In the past decades, the government of New Zealand has pushed for policies that support the various rights of the Māori people. Of a more recent occurrence is the larger debate of a multicultural society, which considers the country as comprised of a people with a plurality of backgrounds. Auckland, the country's largest city, accentuates this point; characterized as a "superdiverse" city, it includes a plurality of at least 200 distinct ethnic, national, religious, and linguistic factions. (Simon-Kumar 2019.)

Since the turn of the century, New Zealand's migration governance has been known for its emphasis on establishing foundations for a functioning multicultural society. This is a tradition set forth by a Labour government in the beginning of 2000's led by Prime Minister Helen Clark, who focused on cultural diversity as a central political theme. Since the policy changes commenced by the Clark rule, New Zealand has seen the introduction of several institutional changes that support the settlement of migrants in the country. These include, among other, the consolidation of the Race Relations Commission and the establishment of several ethnic-language media. (Simon-Kumar 2019.) In the global creativity index 2015 by the Martin Prosperity Institute, New Zealand was ranked number one in the world in terms of racial and ethnic tolerance (Florida et al. 2015, 18).

According to an IPSOS survey (2016), many New Zealanders perceive migration issues quite positively. Among the respondents of the IPSOS poll, 31 % expressed negative views and 47% answered having positive perceptions on the impact of immigration in New Zealand (p. 10). However, despite a widely positive outlook on immigration, more than half of the poll respondents thought that immigration causes too much pressure on public services, and would not increase the levels of current immigration to the country (ibid., 11). Another survey by the New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2016, 5) on New Zealanders' attitudes to migrants shows that the overall perceptions of migrants have remained quite stable in the past years, with respondents having rated an average of 6.6 on a scale of 0 ('not at all positive') and 10 ('very positive').

New Zealand adopted the UN global compact for migration after the GCM was first debated in the parliament and addressed in local news media platforms. New Zealand had not yet decided upon its stance with the compact by the time the UN intergovernmental conference in Morocco was due. Therefore, it did not participate in the conference in Marrakesh. Finally, the government voted in favour of the compact during UN General Assembly on 19 December 2018, followed by an explanation of vote. In the parliament, an upfront opposer to the compact was the National Party, which held concerns of the GCM stripping the country from its sovereign right to set its own immigration policy in the future (*NZ Herald*, July 1, 2019).

Both countries as former British colonies share vivid histories of migration. In present day, they are also characterized by being part of the global community, which is structured around international organizations. Being members of the global community is detectable from the several human rights instruments that both countries are signatories to. Many of these are also related to the rights of migrants. An overview of some of the human rights agreements that Australia and New Zealand are parties to is presented in a table below.

Instrument	Open for Signatures (year)	Came into Force (year)	Parties (no.)	AU (year of ratification)	NZ (year of ratification)
Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (ILO No. 97)	1949	1952	50	—	1950
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees	1951	1954	146	1954	1960
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness	1961	1975	75	1973	2006
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees	1967	1967	147	1973	1973
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	1965	1969	182	1975	1972
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention (ILO No. 143)	1975	1978	25	—	—
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families	1990	2003	55	—	—

Table 1. Ratification of selected UN and ILO human rights instruments in Australia and New Zealand.

AU = Australia, NZ = New Zealand.

Status of the treaties presented in the table represent the situation of 01 February 2020.

Sources: The United Nations (UN) Treaty Collection – Status of Treaties:

https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx?clang=_en, and International Labour Organization (ILO), NORMLEX – Ratifications by Convention: <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:::NO::>

As can be seen, both Australia and New Zealand are parties to human rights treaties that also concern migrants, including the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, neither country is a party to a 1990 International Convention of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families nor to an ILO Convention concerning the rights of migrant workers from 1975. The table presents only some human rights instruments, but it can already be seen that outside the refugee regime, wider consensus appears more challenging to realize and many states are more reluctant to ratify.

2.5. Why States Adopt Non-Binding Agreements? Human Rights as an Example of a Globally Diffused Regime

Particularly with human rights, the proliferation of legally non-binding instruments is distinct. As Lagouette et al. (2016, 1) have mentioned, only a few human rights treaties have seen the light of day in contrast to the abundance of various declarations, resolutions and similar instruments generated under the UN over the past 20 years. Even with binding agreements, human rights are peculiar among other governance regimes. By signing onto human rights agreements, states commit themselves to following a set of standards which are designed “to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities” (Moravcsik 2000, 217).

It seems more straight-forward to comprehend why binding agreements exist in the global arena. According to Betts (2011, 1), there is a commonly shared understanding that multilateral agreements and coalitions serve as best means to encounter globally affecting, pressing policy issues. This understanding has led to the myriad of transnational governance networks in fields characterized by wide-spread effects, of which economic trade serves as a prime example (ibid.). However, the international human rights regime differs from many other governance regimes; it includes many non-binding instruments, and there are discrepancies regarding formal commitments and their realization. Paradoxically, it even seems that states which severely violate against human rights are parties to the most notable human rights agreements (O’Brien and Gowan 2012, 23).

Hafner-Burton et al. (2008) argue that the most rights abusive governments sign onto human rights norms because of the external legitimation that comes with adopting them, whilst being aware that non-compliance rarely leads to serious sanctions. Their line of argument follows a sociological institutionalist interpretation of the decoupling between policy and practice. In their willingness to appear as legitimate, states comply with institutionalized “global scripts” such as adopting human rights agreements, leading to an isomorphic world order with commonly shared structures and policies. As the international human rights regime is characterized by low levels of monitoring and enforcement procedures, widespread treaty ratifications are likely to occur together with the absence of actual changes in practices. (ibid., 121.)

The term ‘soft law’ is used when there are no legally binding obligations nor sanctions to non-compliance of set standards (Schäfer 2006, 195). Lagouette et al. (2016, 1) use the term ‘soft law’ of legally non-binding instruments that function as means of establishing norms in the global arena. Their definition of ‘soft law’ is described as the “rules (prescribing conduct or otherwise establishing standards) that are in the process of becoming, though may not ultimately become, binding rules of international law” (ibid., 5). Although their definition implies that in the making, there is an implicit expectation of soft law standards transforming into binding forms of conduct over time, the authors also acknowledge that soft law may be used for another reason; it provides “political flexibility” which

could entail more leeway for actors (ibid., 8). That is, a gradual codification of soft law principles into clauses of some form of legislation is not necessarily an object in the creation of soft law. According to Dehousse (2016, 20), soft forms of governance rest “more on emulation and peer evaluation than on formal constraints, and allow different (particularly national) responses to problems.” Thus, actors such as nation-states may opt for soft governance when they wish to sustain political flexibility, and when the motivation to change recognized practices is not driven by forceful coercion.

Schäfer (2006) also points to flexibility but approaches the topic with a different emphasis. The author argues that soft law instruments are utilized in order to avoid a political dead end. Thus, Schäfer highlights that rather than opting for soft law instruments because of their desirable outcomes, actors choose soft law instruments primarily to settle stark disagreements during a negotiation phase (ibid., 194). This view highlights an aspect of compromise for the function of soft law in governance.

Realist approaches highlight the self-interested, power-driven nature of states (for reference, see Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, 1380). In this view, states adopt human rights agreements if they see them as useful for their interests. For example, O'Brien and Gowan (2012, 23) mention that one way to perceive the creation of international human rights agreements is to view it as a process of “cost-benefit analysis” in which states have different self-interested reasons to enter negotiations and sign the final draft. This view goes accordingly with the “mainstream”, “common-sense” or “rational” model for public policy which considers policy change in instrumental terms. This approach views decision-making as a somewhat balanced process by which actors negotiate their agendas and interests with careful evaluation over the pros and cons of available options. (Sutton 1999, 9.) However, the GCM case illustrates possibilities that do not seem to entirely fit this frame. The non-legally binding nature of the migration compact makes it uncertain in terms of outcomes; what would then be the concrete benefits for the states adopting it? Unarguably, the compact is perceived as important and relevant, as shown by the ample global process of its creation and widespread adoption. It seems, though, that other factors than mere rational calculations have played a part in the process.

An institutional approach would emphasize that human rights instruments are adopted because it makes states appear ‘good’ and ‘legitimate’ in the eyes of the global community. Institutional accounts consider how various phenomena are influenced by “culture, norms and institutions” (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006, 13-14). Neo-institutional accounts, in particular, criticize perceiving institutions with mere instrumental value, as mainly serving the needs of self-interested actors. They claim that this tendency overlooks how actors are limited in their capacity to act due to their institutional restrictions. (Lecours 2005, 8.) Among different strands of neo-institutionalism, a sociological approach emphasizes the highly isomorphic structures of nation-states (Alasuutari 2015, 4). This is evident, for example, in the way states follow similar practices, such as when they

formally endorse universal declarations under the United Nations framework. Sociological institutionalism posits that actors act in a similar manner because conformity and rationality are so highly regarded (Alasuutari 2015, 5). For example, in their classical article on organizational change, DiMaggio and Powell (1982) argue that institutional isomorphism is the outcome of high degrees of rationalization and bureaucracy. As various actors try to change institutional practices or structures in a cogent way, they simultaneously end up transforming institutions to resemble one another (ibid.).

According to Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, signing human rights instruments is easy due to their non-coercive nature, working well for the purposes of “window dressing” (2005, 1378). However, even when a decoupling of commitments and practices appears to be the case for the state, the consolidated legitimacy of human rights agreements (through the amount of ratifications they receive) equips non-state actors with a stronger ground to advocate for human rights in local contexts. (ibid.) Thus, even though the aim of appearing as rational and legitimate may be a driving force for states to adopt human rights agreements, it does not mean that signing onto such instruments would be ineffectual.

As soft law is not legally binding, what is then the equation that leads governments to act upon it? In the context of the UN migration compact, Roele (2017, 11) has stated: “The engine of implementation, as it were, is not the threat of coercive enforcement but the difficulty of refusing offers of cooperation and assistance to make good on one’s promise.” The mechanism of compliance seems to be based more on normative, shared standards and cultural conceptions of appropriate state behavior, particularly, as the GCM is a highly value-laden framework.

A wide array of perspectives have aimed to open up space for academic discussion on the role of soft law in global governance. Although realist approaches resonate with empirical reality, they do not seem convincing in explaining all aspects of the creation and wide-spread adoption of the United Nations migration compact. Many states already work in the spirit of the GCM in terms of migration policymaking, and their support for the compact seems to be characterized more by moral reasoning than a mechanical cost-benefit analysis. The world culture theory ascribes global cultural norms a central role; these would seem to explain some of the elements of the GCM process better than realist descriptions. However, the world culture theory also fails to address some central aspects in more detail. Why, for example, would countries like Australia with an adequate domestic infrastructure for accommodating the GCM reject it? Notwithstanding the idea that globally shared cultural principles can be seen as influencing the decision-making behavior of states, this thesis will extend from this point by emphasizing the domestic processes that determine how some global models become locally received, and whether they become finally adopted and implemented.

3. Research Methodology

In this section, I explain the approach to my research topic by presenting the methodological overview applied in the thesis. I begin by presenting the research problem and research questions, and then continue to describe the theoretical orientation and the method for data analysis. Furthermore, I will explicate the process of data collection and present the rationale behind the methodological choices made. Ethical considerations, and the reliability and validity of the research, will also be addressed.

3.1. Research Problem and Research Questions

This thesis has been conducted around the following research problem: if modern nation-states have similar understandings about the principles to be guided by in the governance of migration (i.e. safeguarding human rights and protecting state sovereignty), then how is it possible that some states would withdraw from the compact, which is not legally binding, and that its necessity is also debated in states which eventually endorse it?

To approach the research problem, it appears logical to examine the dynamics that take place on the local levels of the GCM debates. What happens when a global compact becomes introduced in local contexts? In this thesis, the local contexts are provided by Australia and New Zealand. The chosen public sites for meaning-construction are the mass news media platforms with wide audiences in both countries. The news media content will provide insights into which discourses are publicly dominant in the chosen local contexts regarding the GCM, and which rhetorical strategies were deployed by actors in their aim to establish credibility behind their reasoning.

The research questions posed to the empirical data are the following:

RQ 1: How have actors in domestic GCM discourses argued about the UN migration compact in Australia and New Zealand whilst potentially safeguarding their own distinct political interests?

RQ 2: Which values and moral principles have been evoked by these arguments; i.e. what kind of moral rhetoric have different actors viewed as resonating with their local publics?

3.2. Theoretical Orientation

According to (Atkinson 2017, 28), methodology comprises “a set of assumptions about reality and how one can engage with and learn about the world.” In other words, it is important for the researcher to acknowledge and be transparent about the ontological views underlying the approach to the

research problem. The theoretical orientation in this thesis follows the lines of social constructionism (Berger and Luckmann 1966/1967) which sees that everyday knowledge about the world around us as we become to know it is constructed in social interaction and negotiation between humans. In particular, the research problem is approached with a view that considers language and texts as not only reflective of the world we live in, but as important components that actively construct the social reality of our everyday lives (Atkinson 2017, 84). Further attention will be given next to the specific theories guiding this thesis: domestication of world models, and the role of values in governance and persuasion.

3.2.1. Domestication of World Models and Global Trends

The global-local interaction in the spreading of policy models and ideas across states has often been addressed with research conducted on 'policy diffusion' and 'policy transfer'. Studies on policy diffusion and transfer look at the "processes of domestic adaption as a result of rising international interdependence, enhanced international communication and the growing legalization of international relations" (Müller and Falkner 2014, 3). Under diffusion research, the mechanism behind the spreading of world models has typically been considered as operating through coercion, competition, learning and emulation (for a review, see Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 2). However, the macro level focus of traditional diffusion research ignores the local level processes that influence how world models actually intertwine with domestic realities (ibid.). Thus, domestication theory helps to fill the gap by providing a framework for observing local practices of interaction with global models.

The most conventional way to approach domestication is to associate the concept with the taming of wild animals. In the context of media and communication studies, as well as within the sociology of technology, domestication as a concept is applied to refer to the "processes of (media) technology's acceptance, rejection and use", particularly from the viewpoint of everyday life and the way technology influences it. (Berker et al. 2006, 1-2.) In their book on national policy-making as domestication of global trends, Alasuutari and Qadir (2014) address the importance of taking interdependent decision-making into account in a globalized world. The starting point is to acknowledge the peculiar parallel existence of cross-national isomorphism in the institutional structures and practices between nation-states, and a strong sense of local authenticity between their citizens (ibid.). The approach of domestication is specifically interested in investigating how these parallel realities – global institutional isomorphism and strong senses of local uniqueness - co-exist in a global world.

Alasuutari and Qadir (2014, 9) describe domestication as: "...not a synonym for adoption, enactment or implementation of a particular model. Instead, it depicts a transformation in which a reform process initiated by references to exogenous models, ideas or catchwords results in people viewing the

outcome as a unique domestic creation.” For example, a government could decide to adopt a successful-seeming policy model from another country, and the subsequent local processes would amend it to suit the domestic context. However, the change would be addressed in ways that would enhance a strong sense of local uniqueness and agency so that adopting the new model would not be conceived as imitation (Alasuutari 2015, 11). In essence, the domestication of globally spreading trends can be encapsulated as a process by which locally relevant solutions are created to an exogenous policy issue by first formulating a national interest as a response to it (Alasuutari and Qadir 2019, 110).

The process of domestication is seen as dynamically evolving through stages which ultimately tame an exogenous influence so that it becomes internalized as a local, rather than an external, item (Alasuutari and Qadir 2014, 10). Alasuutari and Qadir suggest that the domestication process typically begins with cross-national comparisons, by which an item becomes introduced to the national political agenda. For example, a perceived need for social reform could be argued for by referring to similar situations and how they have been resolved in other countries. (ibid., 10.) The introduction of an issue as a problem in need of policy solutions often leads to a local field battle. This stage of domestication is characterized by two fundamental rules: actors use arguments and justifications that appeal to the whole nation or to the common good, whilst they simultaneously defend their own particular stakeholder interests. (ibid., 11-12.) This field battle is “of a rhetorical nature”, implying that actors engage in debates with the aim of winning majority support behind their claims about what the issue is and how it should be resolved (ibid., 12). The final stage of domestication is depicted as “naturalization” through “nationalization”. During this process, actors become used to the domesticated item and start viewing it as a natural part of the local reality. (ibid., 13.)

The domestication framework is seen as adding to the neo-institutional world culture approach of how models and ideas spread across nation-states. By referring to culture as global, it is seen that “definitions, principles, and purposes are cognitively constructed in similar ways throughout the world” (Boli and Thomas 1997, 173). The globally instituted culture of the world polity guides action as well as constitutes actors in their institutional environments (ibid.). Principles such as “individualism”, “universalism” and “rational progress” are especially highlighted by world culture (ibid., 180-182). The spreading of global models is explained by the will of actors to appear as rational, leading them to sometimes adopt models that are ill-suited to their domestic contexts. This manifests as a decoupling between commitments and actions. Therefore, the world culture theory sees actors as “hypocritical conformists.” (Alasuutari et al. 2019, 6-7.) The domestication framework derives many of its underlying premises from the world culture tradition, but it treats actors’ agency differently and grants wider attention to the domestic dynamics that play a key role in how ideas and models spread in the world.

To analyze how the GCM became the object of public debates in the initial stages of the domestication process – local introduction and the subsequent political disputes – I focused on the ways different actors took a stand on how the compact should be received. Thus, I examine the justifications used, and the values invoked, regarding the purported local significance of the compact. Actors engaging in the national GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand attempted to construct validity behind their claims with the purpose of influencing social change or further legitimizing already established decisions. By referring to ideas of how the world is and how it should be structured, and by appealing to different actor identifications, norms and principles, actors construct a firmer ground for their reasoning in order to convince others about what should be viewed as true. This kind of persuasion work may also be referred to as “epistemic governance”. (Alasuutari 2016.)

3.2.2. Governance as Cultural: The Role of Values

Often, the processes of introducing and debating policy solutions entail actors with vested interests debating over how to view the issue under debate, and which ways to respond to it should be deemed appropriate. This process is conceived by Alasuutari (2015, 15) as “struggles over meaning and over a hegemonic definition of the situation at hand.” This usually entails more than only factually based arguments: actors also evoke shared values and principles to appeal to the wider moral sentiment of what is perceived acceptable and desirable in a given situation (ibid.). With this perspective, governance itself becomes considered as functioning in “more or less unself-conscious ways by which actors work on people’s conceptions of reality” regardless of whether this happens by means of rhetorical persuasion or even coercion (ibid.).

Alasuutari (2016) views the decision-making behavior of actors as heavily influenced by cultural factors. This is notably emphasized in his theorizing of “epistemic governance” (ibid.). Simply put, this refers to persuasion work exercised by actors trying to affect others’ understandings of reality (ibid., 40-41). According to Alasuutari, an epistemic governance approach is central in comprehending the processes of decision-making because of the way it focuses on the “cultural logic of people’s thought and action” (ibid., 44). This viewpoint highlights that culture, which could be seen as comprising “a set of fundamental principles and models... defining the nature and purposes of social actors and action” (Boli and Thomas 1997, 172), is of central importance to understand the nature of governance.

When actors try to persuade others into accepting their version of events, they have to know how others in their community of reference perceive the world around them, how they identify themselves and view other actors, and what kind of values and norms they share. These three aspects form the core for epistemic governance. (Alasuutari 2016, 40-41.) This thesis focuses on the third aspect,

values and norms, in the processes of domestication. However, the pillars of epistemic governance – ontological claims, identifications, and values - typically appear in combination with one another (Alasuutari 2015, 16). Therefore, it would be artificial to fully separate these elements from each other. They are interlaced in the construction of claims and arguments.

Values form a remarkable basis for human behavior. As described by Mahrt (2010, 7): "values define what is desirable or not and how one should behave in a given situation according to the rules of one's society". Values become central in orienting motivation, leading to particular forms of action (ibid.). Even though values can be closely associated to the personality of the individual, they also constitute the essence of cultures and societies at large (ibid., 26). Values can be seen as "guiding principles or ideals" that have an impact on how we come to judge what is acceptable in specific situations. They are closely linked to norms; norms may be viewed as "implicit or explicit expressions of values" that set guidelines for an etiquette of conduct in particular contexts. (ibid., 37.)

According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, 75), values are an inevitable part of the process when a specific issue becomes concerned, particularly, within fields such as law and politics. According to them: "One appeals to values in order to induce the hearer to make certain choices rather than others, and, most of all, to justify those choices so that they may be accepted and approved by others" (ibid.). Following this line, the usage of values not only aims at public acceptance of one's claims, but also has the objective of motivating the audience towards a certain form of action; towards making particular choices.

Value-based rhetoric deployed by actors trying to be persuasive is based on "an assumption of what the society they speak to values the most" (Alasuutari and Qadir 2019, 162). Focusing on the value-laden aspects invoked in the arguments concerning the GCM may reveal insights regarding what actors considered their surrounding society to hold as morally acceptable and important. Paying attention to the values and moral conceptions utilized by actors participating in the national GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand allows us to identify how they constructed authority behind their claims and how, in the process, the GCM became domesticated.

By focusing on the values and moral principles used for constructing a national interest around the GCM, we can dissect how different actors made the migration compact appear locally sensible. This is at the very core of the second stage of domestication; local struggles over the most valid and the most acceptable meaning of a specific exogenous influence.

3.3. Method: Rhetorical Analysis

To analyze how the GCM has been domesticated in New Zealand and Australia through public mediation, a choice of method for data analysis is rhetorical analysis. My focus will be on the rhetoric of GCM discourses in the widely read news media platforms in both countries. This way, I am able to dissect how the migration compact was made locally sensible with arguments that used values and moral principles as rhetorical assets to legitimize GCM-related claims.

As Posch (2018, 247) defines it, rhetorical analysis centers on “finding and interpreting persuasive strategies in language.” Studying rhetoric dates far back in history to classical Greece, with Aristotle being one of the most prominent figures of the ancient times to develop our understanding of rhetoric. He was the first to provide a coherent, systematic theory on the act of persuasion. (ibid., 248.) From Aristotle, we have inherited the terms “ethos”, “pathos” and “logos.” Ethos relates to the ways the speaker expresses her characteristics; pathos refers to the receptive ‘mood’ of the audience, i.e. the emotion of the person(s) the speaker is trying to persuade; and logos refers to the actual arguments used by the speaker. (Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998, 233.)

Studying rhetoric allows us to investigate the communicatory means by which we produce and socially construct knowledge (Ihlen and Heath 2018, 3). A mainstream view of the study of language use emphasizes the profoundly rhetorical nature of communication, and acknowledges that rhetoric plays a central role in how we come to know about the world around us. Within social sciences and humanities, this line of theoretical orientation is usually referred to as the “rhetorical turn”. The twentieth century marked a new interest to study the persuasive means of language use in various contexts. Differing from the classical conceptualizations of rhetoric, scholars under the umbrella of ‘new rhetoric’ saw rhetorical means as being used in many different forms of mediation apart from merely settings where there is a speaker speaking to a live audience. (Ihlen and Heath 2018, 5.)

Rhetorical analysis may potentially unveil many commonly shared values and beliefs held in a given society. Sometimes, the speaker is not aware of the values she incorporates; the wider cultural principles and norms shared in society are often subconsciously applied by the speaker. Thus, studying rhetoric may even be viewed as a form of cultural analysis. (Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998, 239-240.) In this thesis, rhetoric is not only viewed through the lens of persuasion which aims at achieving the most support behind one’s claims. The applied approach, following the lines of Kakkuri-Knuuttila, also considers studying rhetoric as a method of revealing wider cultural values in the context of the text.

The context for communication is also important in rhetorical analysis. Focusing on the surrounding social context of the text is what differs rhetorical analysis from linguistic studies that center on various elements of language (McKee and Porter 2020, 111). Rhetoric does not occur in a vacuum

but is motivated and influenced by the surrounding social context, which is also referred to as the rhetorical context (ibid., 110). The rhetorical context helps to comprehend why certain kind of rhetoric is chosen instead of some other repertoire of rhetorical tactics in a given communicatory situation (ibid., 111).

As an important principle, rhetorical analysis should be conducted in the original language of the text. Translations pose too remarkable a threat of twisting the original elements present in the source. (Cuypers 2015, 134.) This is why the chosen states for data analysis represent English-speaking countries; besides Finnish, which is my mother tongue, the only language I speak fluently is English. Additionally, the GCM was not remarkably discussed in the Finnish context. Studying rhetorical means in its original language was, therefore, possible by choosing English-speaking countries.

In terms of identifying cultural values in rhetoric, it is central to examine the arguments given for a specific claim. The arguments might emphasize the desirability of a particular outcome. They give indications of what the speaker considers to be valued among her audiences. In addition, to search for values in a text, the analysis should concentrate on diction; word choices with negative or positive connotations, as well as comparisons, metaphors, and other aspects in a sentence structure. For example, the order in which claims are presented could indicate what is valued in the wider societal and historical context of the text. (Kakkuri-Knuuttila 1998, 264.)

Another important element in the study of rhetoric is the concept of audience. The audience could be described as “*the gathering of those whom the speaker wants to influence by his or her arguments*” (Perelman 1982, 14, emphasis in original). Thus, to understand the societal context of argumentation, it is necessary to consider to whom the text is intended for. In relation to the audience, the goal of the speaker is often to induce a motivation to act (Perelman 1982, 12). In other words, the usage of rhetorical means typically aims towards some form of action among the members of the audience, instead of only convincing them about a particular version of events.

Describing how factual versions of events are constructed in social interaction, Potter (1996, 108) applies rhetoric to “the antagonistic relationship between versions”. By this he indicates that rhetorical means are not only used to form a version of events, but they simultaneously undermine alternative versions, and are formulated in a way that competing views may be resisted (ibid.). This account brings an important aspect to the surface; whilst rhetorical assets, such as the usage of values, are used to build a particular perspective as more credible, it reminds us that this functions simultaneously to deem other perspectives as erroneous or less valid. In other words, what is omitted is also relevant to consider.

Political speech is often characterized as being persuasive by nature. This is because political processes are usually largely reliant on the wider agreement of the general public. (Posch 2018, 251.) The process of domestication, functioning through the principles of epistemic governance,

relies on persuasiveness and the effectiveness of rhetorical means applied by actors who participate in domesticating a world model. Thus, rhetorical analysis is a suitable method for dissecting how, on the level of value-based rhetoric, different actors have discussed and debated about the migration compact in Australia and New Zealand.

The intended audiences for the speakers in the data include the readerships of the chosen news media and, generally, the citizens of the whole nation in both country contexts; in particular, those who have the right to vote. Additionally, those who hold political power, i.e. parliamentarians and members of the state government have also been an intended audience for many speakers in the analyzed news data. In the current global and digital era, it is also a given that any online news media content may be widely distributed and circulated across the world. In that regard, it might be considered that the 'global community' has been another intended audience for state leaders, in particular. They are aware that their statements will be reported about in other countries. Thus, the acknowledgement of the fact that how they talk about the migration compact will set an image for their leadership and for their nation-state to the outside world may be viewed as another factor influencing the way state leaders have addressed the GCM.

3.4. Data Collection

The data used in this thesis is "naturalistic data", meaning that the data collected is independent – as much as is achievable - from the researcher's interventions (Potter & Shaw 2018, 182). In this thesis, using naturally occurring data means that the production of data was free from manipulation on the researcher's side: the data was published independently from my intention to study the national media discussions of the GCM in Australia and New Zealand. Thus, the selected data may be viewed as appropriate for dissecting how different actors have considered it efficient to discuss the GCM in a particular country context.

As Alasuutari (2013, 105) mentions, focusing on media coverage provides a useful way of unpacking the processes of domestication. He states that to ordinary citizens, many things become real "practically only through the media, via the discourses by which they are made sense of and worth learning about" (ibid.). Thus, the media have a central role in how certain topics become perceived and received, and how different subjects become introduced into the consciousness of people. In addition, the media serve as a central bridge of communication between citizens and policymakers and different political factions in society, and has the potential to affect public opinion (Strömbäck and Esser 2014, 3-4). Thus, accounting for media sources in political rhetoric may be deemed suitable for dissecting forms of argumentative talk aimed at persuading large, local audiences.

The data was derived from major online news media platforms in Australia and New Zealand. The decision for not choosing parliamentary data was determined by the fact that in Australia, there was practically no parliamentary debate about the migration compact. From both countries, I included the website of a widely read newspaper alongside three other news websites that enjoy frequent readership visits. Major news media platforms provide a naturally occurring public setting for investigating what types of GCM arguments have been present in both countries, who have been the speakers given space in these forums, and what kinds of values and moral principles have they evoked in their argumentation. News websites were chosen because in the current digital age, the general decline of legacy news media audiences is an evident trend (Nygren et al. 2018, 35-36).

For Australia, the chosen newspaper was *The Australian*, a broadsheet published six days a week. This is one of the two national dailies in Australia. The other national newspaper is the more business-oriented *Australian Financial Review*, which was not chosen specifically because of its main focus on the business world. *The Australian* was not only chosen for its national scope, but because when compared to other Australian newspapers with larger readerships such as the *Sydney Morning Herald*, *The Australian* seemed to have covered the UN migration compact quite extensively. In addition, its approach to aim for nation-wide outreach provides an interesting insight into the ways of writing that are aimed to appeal to the general audience. The news websites that were chosen from Australia were news.com.au, ABC News – abc.net.au and 9news.com.au. These are largely visited news websites in Australia, according to digital content rankings by Nielsen (Nielsen 2019; Nielsen 2018). Additionally, BBC Media Profile of Australia has listed these platforms among the most prominent news media websites in the country (BBC 2019).

From New Zealand, the newspaper chosen was *NZ Herald*, a daily newspaper with the largest readership in the country. It is a daily newspaper published in Auckland. The decision to include a daily with the largest readership was made as a result of the fact that there are no truly national newspapers in New Zealand. The news websites included were stuff.co.nz, newshub.co.nz and tvnz.co.nz. According to SimilarWeb statistics from September 2019 (cited in Myllylahti and Baker 2019, 25), these are among the online news websites with largest readerships in New Zealand. Stuff and *NZ Herald* have a clear lead in their digital audiences with other news websites following far behind (ibid.). Stuff has its own website but also the newspapers *The Dominion Post* and *The Press* operate under its umbrella (ibid., 19). The same online news media websites - stuff.co.nz, newshub.co.nz and tvnz.co.nz –were also widely visited in September 2018, according to SimilarWeb (cited in Myllylahti 2018, 22).

Including several media sources was possible due to the migration compact not having generated extensive public discussions over a long period of time in neither country context. Thus, focusing only on one or two media sources per country would have only yielded a relatively small data size.

Expanding the search to several platforms was also an interesting dive into identifying how various news media channels have reported about the migration compact.

To search for data, I used several key words in the search engines of the chosen news websites: “migration”, “global compact migration”, “UN Global Compact migration”, “United Nations migration compact” and “UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.” As I soon realized, these would still not catch every article and document about the compact. For example, it was fairly common to find references to the GCM as “the pact” or “the migration deal”. I received more results when I also used other related words such as “Marrakesh” or “Morocco” and “treaty”, “agreement” or “pact” together with “UN” or “migration”. The search results that were discarded included those in which the GCM was only briefly mentioned without any further elaboration, such as if the GCM was part of a list when discussing something else. With regard to access to data, a short-term subscription to *The Australian* was paid in order to gain access to the newspaper pieces relevant for this thesis. Other news websites were accessible without a subscription.

The collected media data does not only represent news articles. There are also opinion pieces of editors or visiting columnists, citizens’ opinions, audio recordings and videos of interviews. For example, the data includes videos of news broadcasts, a 16-minute live studio debate about the GCM in Australia and a radio interview of the Prime Minister in New Zealand. The data were transcribed as well as possible on the parts that concerned the GCM. The transcripts are not verbatim, meaning that the transcribing process omitted sounds such as coughs and other elements such as stutters and filler words (Worthy, GMR Transcription, 2019). Instead, my transcribing focused on the justifications, arguments, explanations, and concerns expressed about the migration compact. The limitations to my data include the fact that I am not a native English speaker, which poses the potential for errors in the process of transcription. However, I carefully re-listened to the audio data as many times as required and used Google as a source of searching for words that I was not sure about. The audio data is not complete in the sense that overlapping speech, for example, made it sometimes very difficult to determine what was being said. However, I evaluated, whilst re-listening to the audios, whether they seemed to have captured the most important parts for my data analysis. Naturally, it is also another limitation that the chosen media platforms exclude other sources that could have yielded insightful findings. For example, using only one newspaper per country means that other prestigious newspapers were elided. The following tables present the collected data from both countries.

Media Source	News Articles	Opinion Pieces	Audio Transcripts (Video, Radio)	Total
The Australian	8	9		17
9news.com.au	6			6
news.com.au			3	3
abc.net.au			3	3
Total	14	9	6	29

Table 2. Data collected from Australia. Opinion pieces include columns from the newspaper staff and visiting writers, editorials, and shorter opinion pieces from readers. Audio transcripts include, inter alia, interviews and news broadcasts aired on the tv and the radio, and a studio debate with experts from different fields.

Media Source	News Articles	Opinion Pieces	Audio Transcripts (Video, Radio)	Total
NZ Herald	5	3	3	11
stuff.co.nz	7	2	2	11
newshub.co.nz	11	1	2	14
tvnz.co.nz	2		1	3
Total	25	6	8	39

Table 3. Data collected from New Zealand. Opinion pieces include editorials and columns. Audio transcripts include, inter alia, interviews of politicians on the radio and in a tv studio, and a video clip of a parliamentary floor debate.

Published / Broadcasted (month/year)	Australia	New Zealand
December 2017	1	
July 2018	6	
August 2018	8	
November 2018	10	
December 2018	4	22
February 2019		1
March 2019		5
April 2019		1
May 2019		1
June 2019		1
July 2019		2
Total	29	33

Table 4. Data organized to a timeline (time of publishing / broadcasting). All media sources are aggregated per country. The figures for New Zealand are slightly different from those presented in table 3, due to some of the news articles also containing videos / audio content in them. In table 3, text and audio sources were separated to portray how many different types of data were analyzed.

As one can detect from the tables above, the data is presented per country and according to data type, media source and time of publishing. The timelines were determined based on when the earliest and the latest articles discussing the GCM could be found in both countries. Extending the timeline to cover mentions about the compact after the decision to endorse or reject it has been made helps to observe how the process of domesticating the compact has continued.

In the chosen media sources, mentions about the GCM appeared earlier in Australia than in New Zealand. Some of the data had only brief mentions about the compact, whilst some other data included more elaborated reasonings and debates about the GCM. In New Zealand, mentions about the compact appeared also after the peak of December 2018. Public discussions went back to the GCM particularly after the March 2019 mosque attacks in Christchurch.

The data collection and analysis were conducted in consideration of the ethical guidelines on responsible conduct of research set forth by the Finnish Advisory Board on Research Integrity (2012, 30-31). This includes, inter alia, the careful storing of data with backup copies and the principle of meticulousness along the research process. The data was collected from widely read national news media platforms, which lessens the likelihood of collecting falsified articles as the data has been collected from original, well-known sources. The data collected is also publicly available, so no permission was required to access the documents. *The Australian* forms an exception with regard

to permission, as the website of *The Australian* requires a paid subscription before readers can access its news articles. I paid for a short-term subscription to be able to access its articles for the purposes of the thesis. As the types of data are public news media sources, there was no need to consider questions of anonymity. I kept copies of the collected data and data analysis progress along the research process.

3.5. Process of Data Analysis

Mlilo (2016, 19) describes data analysis as follows: “In qualitative researches, done by most social researchers, data analysis is the breaking of data into logical sub-themes that explain the data more clearly and involves the arrangement (coding) of data into categories for easy interpretation.” In this thesis, the process of data analysis also started with the organizing and coding of data. As a process, the data analysis shifted from coding to re-reading and making notes about the data, and going back to the theoretical foundations of the study. As with qualitative research in general, the process of data analysis is often non-linear and may occur together with data collection (Cohen et al. 2018, 644).

The collected data were first categorized according to country context, news media source, type of news media source (for example, news report, opinion piece, audio data) and time of publishing. I also listed the journalists, interviewers and other speakers identified in the news data. I collected different arguments for and against the compact, and listed the speakers to the type of an argument that they had used. I linked the identified arguments to the speakers not only to see who was given space to comment, but to see what they said, and how they said it.

To identify values from the data and the moral principles associated with them, I used deductive coding (Linneberg and Korsgaard 2019, 264) by using the codes ‘value’ and ‘moral principle’ under my coding frame. In deductive coding, codes are often pre-determined, only few in number and derived from the existing theory (ibid.). However, I also identified other rhetorical tactics used by the speakers, such as word choices with a positive or a negative association, different figures of speech, or comparisons. This was made to also help identify what was perceived as being valued among the audiences of the speakers. I collected different values from the arguments by considering what the arguments presented as desirable. Based on the different arguments and values identified, I could come to conclusions of the moral principles that they represented. I also paid attention to what kinds of interests various actors might have had based on their profession, societal position, and the arguments they used. This helped to infer what might have been the aims of the speakers as they argued for and against the migration compact.

3.6. Reliability and Validity

In the context of any research, the concepts of reliability and validity are central. Reliability might be viewed as choosing a suitable method for analyzing and measuring data, whereas validity may be seen as related to the interpretation of results; that the inferences made are correct (Kirk and Miller 1986, 20). Due to the nature of qualitative enquiry as a research orientation with multiple potential ways of conducting analysis, it is a demanding task to ensure reliability and validity in qualitative studies (Cohen et al. 2018, 643). Additionally, qualitative data relies heavily on interpretation, with a possibility for a multitude of interpretations to arise from the same dataset (ibid.). Thus, considering rigor in qualitative research is necessary.

In this thesis, reliability has been taken into consideration by choosing rhetorical analysis as a method for data analysis. It is an appropriate method for the investigation of the persuasiveness of language use. Validity has been taken into consideration by the acknowledgement of previous world culture and domestication research; how these theories explain the spread of world models on a global and local level, and how my findings seem to fit these explanations. Validity is also increased by providing evidence in the form of references to data to assist readers in evaluating whether the inferences made are accurate. A popular aspect within qualitative research tradition is to also emphasize the subjectivity of knowledge construction; how the way we interpret the world around us is influenced by various factors, such as our age, gender, and socio-economical background (Saldaña 2011, 23). Along the research process, I have aimed to be as reflexive as possible about the fact that my subjective position as a student of social sciences, for example, has an influence on the research. For instance, what has been concentrated on in the data analysis is evidently guided by theory, indicating it is impossible to conduct observation from an entirely 'neutral' perspective.

4. The Moral Rhetoric Surrounding the GCM in Australia and New Zealand

In this chapter, the findings of the data analysis are presented. The analysis is organized around the most common arguments for and against the migration compact identified in both countries. These arguments include: 1) The GCM is a threat to the sovereign right of states to determine their own immigration and foreign policies, 2) The GCM is a potential threat to democratic values such as freedom of speech and freedom of the media, and 3) The GCM makes coordinating migration more efficient and humane. Additionally, the aspect of the GCM being 'binding' is analyzed in its own right, as it was recurrently addressed by different speakers. Both states are combined in the presentation of the analysis since the main arguments, values and moral principles were commonly shared in both country contexts.

4.1. A threat to the sovereign right of states to determine their own immigration and foreign policies

One of the most discernible arguments present in the mass news media of both states was the concern of the migration compact potentially hindering the right of sovereign nation-states to set their own immigration and foreign policies. The compact was claimed to prefer to strengthen the rights of migrants over the right of states to determine how to do their own migration policymaking.

The most notable value explicitly used in this line of moral rhetoric was the sovereign state. This was typically used together with the value of national identity. It was often stated that the moral responsibility of state leaders is to ensure that their citizens are safe; in argumentation, this was depicted as a matter of strong border protection policies. It was also articulated as morally questionable for a supranational governance body to intervene in domestic policymaking, especially with regards to migration governance. For example, the opposition party in New Zealand, The New Zealand National Party proclaimed that it would withdraw New Zealand from the compact if it had the opportunity. This statement was based on the argument that the migration compact poses a serious threat to national sovereignty.

“National Party leader Simon Bridges said if his party was in government, it would pull out of the UN's Global Compact on Migration because of its potential to restrict New Zealand's ability to set its own migration and foreign policy.” (Devlin, stuff.co.nz, December 4, 2018)

In this extract, the nation-state of New Zealand is addressed as a unified entity in need of protecting its territory as a sovereign state. The statement highlights the values of national sovereignty and national identity. To suggest that the GCM could potentially restrict the state's capacity to function independently also evokes the value of freedom associated with sovereignty. What is noteworthy about the statement is that it leaves room for change; the decision on the GCM could be modified under the next government. In terms of political interests, The National Party may be viewed as wanting to challenge and question the Labor-led government that, by the beginning of December 2018, had still not decided whether the GCM should be endorsed.

In Australia, the initial reactions to the migration compact were sceptic when the final draft of the GCM was published. Politicians expressed concern, articulating that the final draft did not take national sovereignty accordingly into account. The government expressed particular concern about the potential impact of the GCM on the current border protection policies, as well as on the safety of the nation. To maintain political power and to express professional integrity, the voice of the government was colored with a tone of worry; this kind of rhetoric goes in accordance with the strict

border protection policies that have been in place since 2013. Accordingly, the government continued to address migration by referring to the GCM as a matter of national safety.

“ ‘We’re examining that agreement but the bottom line is we will never sign up to anything that diminishes or undermines or limits our ability to keep Australians safe,’ Mr Turnbull told reporters in Brisbane on Friday.” (9news.com.au, AAP, July 27, 2018)

The former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull uses the value of national identity by connecting the word “we” (the government) with “Australians”, the nation that the local audience is expected to identify with. Implicitly, the rest of the world is also expected to understand the primacy of ensuring the unity and safety of the Australian nation. The Prime Minister’s speech is constructed with diction that paints an atmosphere of threat: the GCM could “diminish”, “undermine” or “limit” the government’s endeavors to maintain national safety. In this extract, it is not specified in more detail how the GCM would damage the safety of the nation. The Prime Minister seems to suggest that the GCM could have the potential power to dismantle current border protection policies under global pressure. The current border protection practices in Australia have been maintained with a heavy national safety and security discourse, which is why the Prime Minister deems it natural to follow a similar tone of argumentation when commenting on the GCM.

A clear example of domestication may be seen from the way the GCM was used as a tool to attack local political opponents. In summer 2018, just before forth-coming by-elections in Australia, the GCM became entangled with local politics while the matter of strict border protection was defended. The Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull expressed that:

“When Labor was in, they abandoned John Howard’s strict policy which we have reinstated, of course. When they abandoned it, we got 50 000 unauthorized arrivals, and we had at least 1200 deaths at sea. We will not let that happen again. Bill Shorten stands for higher taxes, a weaker economy, fewer jobs, lower wages, and weaker borders. That’s why Bill Shorten can’t be trusted, and that is why this by-election and the by-elections around the country are so important for Australia’s future.” (Tewksbury, news.com.au, July 27, 2018)

In the statement, the Prime Minister answers to the media about the migration compact in a way that highlights the opponent party Labor as incompetent to protect the national borders. He compares the former Labor-led government’s border policies to the current state of affairs by using volume – high numbers of unwanted repercussions – to illustrate this point. The choice of diction includes comparatives with a negative association, such as “weaker”, “fewer” and “lower”, indicating what is not desired in society. He also refers to “Australia’s future”, evoking the value of national identity that the current government is portrayed as committed to protect. The value of human rights is also evoked; by referring to the number of deaths at sea under previous government, the Prime Minister

is able to depict the current border protection policies as more humane. This aims at obtaining more acceptability for the current practices among the Australian public and, perhaps, among the global community.

In a similar way, the migration compact was also used as a tool to attack political opponents in New Zealand. The opposition party The National Party accused the government of lacking accountability for being undecided about whether the GCM should be endorsed, even though the Marrakesh conference was drawing nearer. The government responded to the criticism by noting that The National Party had had an active role to play in the creation of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants back in 2016. The GCM thus became amalgamated into local politics. Both parties had the political interest of showing inconsistencies with each other's decision-making behavior in favor of their own stance and conduct.

"Parker further noted that the National-led government had in 2016 voted in favour of a precursor to the compact called the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. 'The reversal by the National Party on its earlier position is desperate, opportunist flip-flop.'" (David Parker, Labour Party MP. In Cheng, *NZ Herald*, December 19, 2018)

In Australia, the question of state sovereignty was consistently linked to the conception of strong border protection, inescapably sparking debates about Australia's detention practices. Having been previously criticized by the global community about its detention policies, the Australian government focused on reaffirming that no external governance body had a legitimate right to intervene in domestic policymaking, especially with regards to migration governance. This line of thought was further consolidated by evoking the values of human rights and national identity.

"Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton attacked the UN and accused it of deliberately seeking to weaken border control. 'Our government fought hard to clean up Labor's border and boats mess and we aren't going to allow any international body to weaken our borders,' Mr Dutton told *The Australian*. 'We fought too hard to stop the deaths at sea and remove kids in detention and we aren't going to have our tough stance compromised by any other country.'" (Benson and Ferguson, *The Australian*, November 21, 2018)

In the same rhetorical tone with former Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, the Australian Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton uses the GCM as a tool to attack the political opponent. Additionally, he also uses the value of human rights to justify strict border protection policies. The aspect of morality utilized in the statement highlights the primacy of the national level of governance in the global rules-based order. Knowing that the question of human rights is sensitive and notably institutionalized around the world, the Home Affairs Minister also uses the value of human rights to legitimize his

stance on tough borders. The GCM is, again, addressed with diction that emphasize threat, which is in alignment with the current governmental policies on Australia's border control.

In comparison to Australia, the discussion about the GCM started later but continued further into 2019 in New Zealand. In the data, the compact became prominently addressed in December 2018, as the intergovernmental conference to adopt the GCM in Marrakesh drew nearer. The media debate was centered on the fact that the government was still indecisive about whether New Zealand should adopt the compact. The GCM was also debated in the parliament, unlike in Australia. The discussion about the GCM was occasionally invoked again later in 2019, although with a decelerated volume in comparison to December 2018.

The main opposition party The National Party had an online petition urging people to support their cause for pulling New Zealand out of the migration compact. However, the tragedy unfolding with the Christchurch terror attacks to two mosques in March 2019 resulted in the party deleting their petition, a decision they then needed to explain to the national media. In this new rhetorical context, the party leader Simon Bridges had to balance between maintaining professional integrity and answering to media speculations about the potential role of the National's anti-GCM rhetoric in the tragic events. The terrorist had written against the migration compact on his weapon, which is why the GCM made headlines again in New Zealand.

As the GCM issue was re-sparked by the Christchurch terror attacks, the analyzed news media included reflections on the reasons that might have motivated the attacker. The National Party had to work on distancing itself from the terror attacks, whilst maintaining a stance against the migration compact. Even though The National Party had deleted their online petition, and the GCM was not specifically mentioned in their foreign policy discussion document in spring 2019 (Cooke, stuff.co.nz, July 1, 2019), the National leader Simon Bridges ensured that the party would still withdraw from the compact if it encountered the opportunity. The argument continued to be based on the value of firm state sovereignty.

“When questioned by Newshub Bridges said National would still withdraw from the pact if the party's elected in 2020. ‘This is about New Zealand deciding its position on immigration by itself not by United Nations’. Bridges said: ‘Our position is that it is important for New Zealand that we set our immigration policy in New Zealand not by the United Nations and we disagree with the United Nations Migration Compact.’ ”
(Small, newshub.co.nz, May 20, 2019)

The statement reflects a similar concern over state sovereignty and border protection as the worry articulated by the Australian government. The value of state sovereignty is brought to surface by contrasting the nation-state starkly with The United Nations, or with the global level of governance.

The UN is portrayed as a threat to the sovereign right of states to govern their own borders and the migration occurring in their own territory.



Simon Bridges was confronted with the idea that the National Party hadn't been honest about why the petition was removed from its website. Credits: Newshub

Image 1. A screen shot of The New Zealand National Party's online petition against the UN Global Compact for Migration. (Image: Newshub. 19 March, 2019. Accessed 2 February 2020. <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2019/03/simon-bridges-backtracks-on-why-un-migration-pact-petition-removed-from-national-s-website.html>)

The supporters of the compact in Australia and New Zealand responded to arguments about the GCM threatening national sovereignty. They referred to the content of the compact, in which one of the main principles guiding the whole framework is the respect for the sovereign right of nation-states. Common values used by the supporters in this context included human rights, solidarity, and accountability. Opposers to the compact were accused of basing their decisions on fear and irrationality, which was deemed as morally unacceptable behavior for a responsible decisionmaker.

“We are better than this — capable of leadership, of supporting hope over fear.”
(Andrew Giles, Victorian Labor MP. In Lewis and Ferguson, *The Australian*, November 22, 2018)

“And just because we have tough borders or border policies doesn't mean we have to compromise our values of humanity. And also, being compliant with international human rights norms.” (Aisha Novakovich, CEO of Modest Fashion Australia. The Drum, in www.abc.net.au, November 21, 2018)

In the extracts, the pronoun “we” is used to indicate a common nation to which the members of the local audience are expected to naturally identify with. In other words, the speakers are invoking the value of national identity. The first statement is articulated by an Australian Labor MP whose political

interest may be interpreted as to challenge the policies of the current government, and to make the government seem questionable in their decision-making. A desired form of leadership is distinctly associated with 'soft' values, shown in the usage of the comparative "better" associated with the expression of "supporting hope over fear". The latter extract by an entrepreneur in Australia depicts, similarly, that safeguarding "values of humanity" should weigh more than the strict protection of borders. To add more moral charge, the speaker also refers to international human rights norms: these are heavily institutionalized, and globally shared under various UN declarations. Being compliant with such norms is portrayed as the moral responsibility of state leaders. In both statements, leadership is associated with solidarity and compassion.

In some statements, the value of success was also brought to light together with state sovereignty. Evoking this value had the point of depicting the GCM as practically useless in the domestic context. The national migration policymaking was articulated as functioning so well that the role of The United Nations could be diminished in terms of national migration governance.

"We do not believe that adopting this agreement will add anything to enhancing our capacity to control our borders and manage our successful immigration program. The compact was promoted as a way to promote safe, orderly and regular migration. We already achieve all of these goals." (The federal government, official statement. Cited in abc.net.au, December 11, 2018)

The same line of sentiment was also present in New Zealand, with the National Party leader Simon Bridges stating that the migration compact would not add anything useful to the already well-functioning national migration policies. This is shown in the usage of the superlative "best" in the below extract. The statement evokes the value of state sovereignty and has the aim of rejecting the idea of adopting the GCM.

"It was important to be clear that New Zealand already had best immigration practice, he [Simon Bridges] said. 'We are open, we have the have the [sic] right processes and policies. We don't need the UN telling us what to do.'" (Devlin, stuff.co.nz, December 4, 2018)

Peculiarly, there was also an expression of strong support for migration in argumentation against the compact. In New Zealand, The National Party leader Simon Bridges mentioned that the party was very "pro-migration". Mr. Bridge's use of a superlative in the below extract potentially shows an attempt to appear as humane, compassionate, and respectful of migrants, whilst standing against the GCM. In this case, there seems to be an attempt to balance between the safety and security discourse applied by the party, and the highly legitimized human rights discourse that the migration compact is rooted in. This might also be an attempt to appeal to both kinds of voters; those who reject the compact, and those who support it. The National Party may be viewed as knowing that

both voter types are important for electoral success. Additionally, this statement comes after the terror attacks in Christchurch; in such a rhetorical context, the party leader considers it necessary to emphasize that the party is not against migration.

“Bridges this morning said National's comments on the compact were ‘legal points around New Zealand determining its law.’ ‘If you look at our immigration position, I think we have the strongest pro-migration position across the Parliament.’” (Walls, *NZ Herald*, March 19, 2019)

As Potter (1996, 108) has noted, rhetoric is constructed not only to convince audiences of a certain truth claim, but to simultaneously deem alternative arguments as less valid. What the government of Australia, for example, omits in its argumentation are many of the viewpoints that the GCM itself highlights in its 23 objectives, such as the question of enhancing international cooperation on migration. The government focuses strictly on the domestic “threat”, centering on the security aspect. The government knows that this approach will resonate with its local public. For example, the global level of governance is addressed with threatening scenarios instead of new opportunities. A similar pattern is discernible in the moral rhetoric expressed in New Zealand, in the concerns articulated by the National Party.

Overall, the argument that the GCM would damage national sovereignty could be viewed as the starting point for domestic GCM debates in both states. Different speakers used the value of the sovereign state, and often associated it with the values of national identity, as well as with universal human rights and other “values of humanity”. In such debate dynamics, the GCM was domesticated as a form of tool against political opponents, and as a framework under which to highlight current national migration policies as successful and sufficient.

4.2. A potential threat to democratic values such as freedom of speech and freedom of the media

Another recurring perspective identified from the media sources in both countries was the question of democratic principles, and the portrayal of the GCM as potentially harmful to some of the core democratic values of society. This argument was more heavily addressed in the media sources in Australia, particularly, in the views expressed in the newspaper *The Australian*. However, this concern was also present in the data from New Zealand. The values of democracy, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press were highlighted as important constituents of the national culture. The moral principle behind this line of argument was that any reasonable state-led decision-making should be based on the values of national sovereignty and accountability; one should not sign up to something that one is not ready or willing to abide by.

In Australia, this concern was mostly expressed by journalists or visiting writers instead of politicians. It is comprehensible that professionals who create public commentaries as part of their work profile would express concerns of this nature. In such statements, it was not questioned whether the GCM would realistically lead to the alleged outcomes. Instead, threatening scenarios to local democratic practices were treated as self-evident repercussions if the GCM was adopted. This is shown in the choice of direct statements, and by the use of words with negative connotations, such as “penalised”, “lose” and “dangerous”. These arguments depict the migration compact as definitely leading to drastic changes in the democratic composition of society. Even when not expressed as a direct opinion, it can be seen that, for example, reporters have chosen to write about the compact from a perspective of threat and concern. The below extracts from journalists and columnists in *The Australian* portray this point.

“Those wishing to speak truth to power will be penalised. Under the UN plan, free speech is hate speech and truth is condemned.” (Oriel, *The Australian*, August 6, 2018)

“The compact requires governments to shape perceptions of migration by promoting ‘evidence-based public discourse’. While some media outlets would lose public funding under the compact, it also requires governments to invest in advertising and ‘ethical reporting standards.’” (Merritt and Riordan, *The Australian*, August 1, 2018)

“The compact then dives into equally dangerous water by stating that one objective is to ‘eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration’. In other words, descriptions of migration that are not positive and fulsome should not be permitted.” (Sloan, *The Australian*, December 15, 2018)

Concerns of this regard were also expressed in New Zealand. In its legal advice to the government, the Crown Law Office outlined it as one of its key points that if adopted, the compact would not impinge on the freedom of speech in society at large. Additionally, accountable governance was also referred to as a moral ideal by the speakers; adopting global compacts should be carefully considered and the repercussions of governmental decision-making should be evaluated before taking action.

“The compact in no way restricts or curtails established human rights, including the right to freedom of expression.” (The Crown Law Office. In Devlin, stuff.co.nz, December 19, 2018)

“The text states, for example, that signatories will assert more control over media coverage of migration issues. If New Zealanders don't think that's a worthy objective,

the country shouldn't sign a piece of paper saying it intends to pursue it." (Hehir, stuff.co.nz, December 17, 2018)

As shown in the latter extract, the value of accountability is evoked; if a state decides to endorse a policy document, it should abide to it, even if it is not legally binding. This is portrayed as a matter of consistency and professional integrity. In the first extract, the Crown Law Office itself may be seen as adding credibility to the statement as a legislative expert and authority. Freedom of expression is mentioned as an important human right which is not under threat by the GCM, a message emphasized by the use of assertive words: "in no way".

The compact is not only mentioned as harmful to local democratic practices, but the speakers also used the value of democracy to undermine the authority of the United Nations. In the GCM debates, some speakers also mentioned the UN as an undemocratic and inefficient organization, and as inappropriate to set guidelines for domestic policymaking. The imagery of a voting citizen was evoked to consolidate this point, highlighting the value of democracy. This type of approach could be seen as a form of an 'anti-globalist' rhetoric which places heavy criticism towards the global rules-based order, and emphasizes the priority of the interests of the nation-state.

"Oh the humanity. Fancy a democratically-elected government not deferring to an unelected committee of overpaid foreign bureaucrats." (The Mocker, *The Australian*, August 2, 2018)

"Now for the record, I wouldn't sign it, mainly because I am no fan of the United Nations. They are by and large an inefficient, ideologically driven behemoth who cause more trouble than good, remain largely ineffective, and wander round the world as a result of their various pacts and programmes trying to tell people what to do." (Mike Hosking, radio talk host. In *NZ Herald*, December 11, 2018)

"This is a key measure of sovereignty and it resides exclusively with those who vote in Australian elections — and that is where it should stay." (Merritt, *The Australian*, August 1, 2018)

As the extracts portray, the articulated scenario depicts a global governance body trying to set restrictions on how issues are to be managed and reported in the domestic context. This is depicted either as tragicomic or as harmful to the democratic principles upon which the societies in New Zealand and Australia are built on. The efficiency of the United Nations is also questioned. This line of argumentation aims at downplaying the importance of the GCM. The speakers appeal to their audiences from this view, considering their audiences to identify with the importance of opposing against the undemocratic-seeming practices of the United Nations.

In consonance with Perelman (1982,12), argumentation often intends to motivate the members of the audience towards a particular form of action. By portraying the GCM as a threat to the core democratic values of society, the speakers have likely aimed at mobilizing their audiences into opposing the compact or deprecating its potential impact. Subsequently, this could lead to an unpopular public opinion influencing governmental decision-making over the GCM. It is also a fact that the news media are interactive: different people react to each other's statements in the mass news media. Thus, different speakers know that their messages will be received by the readers and listeners of various news platforms. Below is an extract where a citizen agrees to the notion that the United Nations is a questionable organization. The writer constructs this view by using the values of state sovereignty and democracy together with diction that highlights threat 'from above':

"Every country should have the sovereign right to decide for itself. There seems to be a push by the UN to become a superpower and to impose its ideologies on all nations."

(a citizen's opinion, *The Australian*, November 22, 2018)

The value of democracy was also used to give more credibility to one's argument. The opinions of citizens are valued since governments in liberal democracies are elected based on popular vote, and they are accountable of their decisions to their electorates. Below is a response to an accusation that the Australian government is simply trying to please its supporters who are more aligned to the right-wing side of the political spectrum by enhancing tough rhetoric over the GCM matter.

"But now, you know, governments do try to reflect the public opinion as well. But I don't think it's about just trying to get your name in the Murdoch papers. It's actually reflecting what people are saying. I mean, in Sydney and Melbourne, population - whether they're right or wrong, I'm just saying, governments are reflecting public opinion here." (Adrian Piccoli, Director of the Gonski Institute for education at the University of New South Wales. *The Drum*, in www.abc.net.au, November 21, 2018)

The speaker is referring to the media empire owned by Rupert Murdoch, who is known as a media proprietor with ownership over several media companies, including the conglomerate News Corp Australia. Murdoch is the founder of the newspaper *The Australian* and also a founder of the news channel Fox News. (Borden, Business Insider, 26 August, 2020.) In the extract, the speaker acknowledges the conservative alignment of the Murdoch media, but goes around the question of political gain by using the value of democracy to justify the line of the government with regards to the migration compact.

Overall, as identified from the presented media extracts, the value of democracy was used in many ways to argue against the compact. Democratic principles were utilized to portray the GCM as threatening, the United Nations as an illegitimate organization when it comes to migration policymaking, and to depict government policies and decisions as considered and reasonable. It was

portrayed as immoral to allow a supranational governance body to intervene in the democratic practices of one's society. To highlight the potential threat of the GCM to local democratic practices shows that the speakers have considered their audiences to appreciate and respect the value of democracy.

4.3. The GCM makes coordinating migration more efficient and humane

With regards to supporting the migration compact, speakers in Australia and New Zealand portrayed the GCM as a step towards more efficiently coordinated and humane migration governance. The compact was also described as necessary since no state has adequate resources to encounter the challenges posed by contemporary migration alone. The most prominent values with which this argument was expressed included global leadership, compassion, solidarity, international cooperation, state sovereignty, and human rights. States were depicted as ruling well once they base their decisions on the principles of universal human rights. Apart from politicians, human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also participated in the debate with this type of moral rhetoric, in particular.

“This is a commitment to keep talking to one another, to strengthen the increasingly threatened rules-based global order, and to stand for human rights in the face of the cruelty that is made possible in their absence. I congratulate the minister and every world leader championing this historic collaboration.” (Golriz Ghahraman, Green Party MP. *NZ Herald*, December 20, 2018)

“Well, I think the implications are that it's very hard to be a leader in your region if you don't stand on the moral high ground. And, you know, being the odd man out, one of just a handful of countries to not signing this, not agreeing to be on board, makes you not look like a leader and not like a team player.” (Suelette Dreyfus. *The Drum*, in www.abc.net.au, November 21, 2018)

In the above extracts, robust statements are made with regards to what morally acceptable governance should be based on. The chosen diction highlights notable ethical standards that state leadership is expected to comply with. In the first extract, the value of international cooperation is used together with the value of human rights. The selected diction emphasizes political posture; this is reflected in the choice of the words “commitment”, “strengthen” and “stand for”. Additionally, an affirmative expression “I congratulate the minister and every world leader” amplifies the sense that the decision made by the government is a ‘correct’ one. The choice of the word “cruelty” has a strikingly negative connotation, and it is used to mark what is not desired; a world without human rights. In the latter quote, Australia is depicted as “the odd man out” who does not “stand on the

moral high ground.” These are explicit statements that emphasize leadership credibility as based on international cooperation and high standards of morality – in this context, the protection of human rights as stated in the GCM. In particular, to be a leader “in your region” shows what is considered to be valued; Australia being a leader in the Pacific region. In this quote, complying with the GCM is depicted to portray a high sense of morality and credible leadership.

As an example of an NGO participating in the debate, the Red Cross in New Zealand tweeted about the government decision to endorse the migration compact. In its tweet, it used words with highly positive connotations, such as “great”, “effective”, and “humane”. The diction chosen for the statement also entails heavy moral charge. For example, it is morally widely acceptable to work under the objective to “save lives.” As an organization committed to working for the protection and support of vulnerable people around the world, the Red Cross commentary has the underlying attempt of maintaining the organization’s professional integrity and image. The Red Cross also has to be noticed in the national media; media visibility increases the chances of connecting with more potential donors, an important element for any charity-based organization. Additionally, media visibility shows to the outside world that the NGO is active in its field, improving the credibility of its work and image.



Image 2. A tweet made by the New Zealand Red Cross in support of the government decision to adopt the UN migration compact.

(Image: Newshub. December 20, 2018. Accessed 2 February 2020. <https://www.newshub.co.nz/home/politics/2018/12/this-is-the-last-straw-donors-slam-red-cross-over-un-global-migration-compact-support.html>)

In Australia, the issue of offshore detention was central in the GCM debates from the viewpoint of humane migration governance. Advocates in support of the compact would accuse offshore detention policies of clashing with established human rights principles. The GCM, it was argued, would bring a needed consolidation into protecting the rights of migrants. By using moral rhetoric based on the value of universal human rights, some speakers aimed at maintaining professional integrity as representatives of various organizations that work to protect the wellbeing of vulnerable people. Below is an extract by Eric Schwartz, President of Refugees International:

“So, for example, while the draft document recognises that migrants may be lawfully detained, it also states that detention should take place in accordance with due process and not be arbitrary. Recognising the threat to human rights that detention can present, it also provides that governments will use detention as a last resort and work toward alternatives — especially in the case of children and families. There is no reason on earth that any Australian government should object to these sorts of aspirational objectives.” (*The Australian*, August 3, 2018)

In the extract, it is depicted as morally desirable that the government re-considers how and when to use migrant detention. The statement evokes the values of human rights and compassion by connecting them with rational decision-making; detention should only be used as a last resort, an objective that “any Australian government” should have no reason to oppose. The speaker depicts the compact as a document established on such morally desirable grounds that no rational, progressive actor should have a valid reason to oppose to it. Rationality, thus, is another central value utilized by the speaker.

Meanwhile, the main Australian opposition party Labor needed to acknowledge Australia’s offshore detention policies whilst emphasizing a ‘neutral’ stance on the GCM debate. What was highlighted by the Labor leader Bill Shorten was the value of considered governance, which he presented as decision-making based on the expertise of national security officials. Using external authority provided by the state security officials as a legitimating factor, the Labor leader aimed to appear as a considered leader without taking a clear stand on the GCM debate. Overall, the Labor party may be seen as trying to find a balance between the national safety discourse applied by the government, and the emphasis on international cooperation traditionally deployed by the Labor party.

“Opposition defence spokesman Richard Marles would not say this morning if Labor would reverse Mr Morrison’s decision on the compact if they win the next election, but he said the move showed the differences in the major parties’ approach to global migration issues. . . . ‘Offshore processing will remain a part of the policy mix if Labor were to form a government but our disposition has always been to work with the global community.’ ” (Benson and Ferguson, *The Australian*, November 21, 2018)

“The Labor leader [Bill Shorten] said he was ‘not fussed’ whether the government did not embrace the global UN agreement for safe, orderly and regular migration and could even ‘pursue the same action’ if he had similar advice in government. . . . ‘Obviously we’ll take the advice of our security experts on what we should or shouldn’t do,’ the Opposition Leader said.” (Lewis and Ferguson, *The Australian*, November 22, 2018)

The above quotations show that the speakers realize the issue of detention policies and border security as a sensitive political topic, particularly because there is public support for the strict control of unauthorized arrivals in Australia. Hence, the Labor Party articulates reluctance towards abolishing the current detention practices, yet it still needed to portray itself as different from the tough stances deployed by the government. In this rhetorical context, the migration compact is discussed in a careful manner. The Labor Party as a major party in the opposition aims for governmental power, but it struggled to position itself clearly on the GCM matter at the crossroads of competing realizations for the shared values revolving around the compact, such as state sovereignty, national identity, and reasonable governance.

In contrast to the media sources analyzed from New Zealand, the Australian context also included foreign commentators with notable professional merits. They participated in the Australian GCM debate, either as visiting columnists or interviewees. Mostly, their contribution to the debate was to give a supportive view of the compact. Below are thoughts on the GCM as expressed by Eric Schwartz, president of Refugees International and also a former Special Assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs. Another extract given below is by François Crépeau, a Canadian professor and a former UN special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants. They both appeal to Australia as a reasonable, rational, and compassionate state by using the values of global leadership, tolerance, democracy, state sovereignty, and considered governance based on universal human rights. They describe Australians as a sympathetic nation that believes in the values and principles represented by the GCM. They also use positive adjectives such as “very good” and “great” to charge their arguments with more favorable connotations in support of the GCM.

“Rather, Australia should be playing a leadership role in encouraging approaches that are informed by human rights, reason, and best practices — without sacrificing enforcement imperatives or national sovereignty. In this respect, support for the global compact on migration would be wholly consistent with the values of democracy and tolerance that Americans and others around the world have long associated with your great country.” (Schwartz, *The Australian*, August 3, 2018)

Interviewer on RN Breakfast: “We are out of time but if Australia isn’t signing on, the US isn’t signing on, Hungary, Israel, Austria, Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, others too signaling they may not, is the pact useless before it’s in existence, really?”

François Crépeau: “No, the pact is not useless. The pact, again, it’s only a conceptual framework. . . . The fact that there is one provision on detention that irks the government is not a good reason to avoid all the other articles of the global compact which are very good and with which most Australians would agree.” (interview on RN Breakfast, in www.abc.net.au, November 22, 2018)

In New Zealand, the government is led by the center-left New Zealand Labour Party, represented by Prime Minister (PM) Jacinda Ardern, who used her voice to abolish the claims made against the migration compact. Yet, in the data that was analyzed, the Prime Minister did not provide personal insight into why the compact should be adopted in New Zealand. This was also a clear difference between the two states: how their governments addressed the GCM. While in Australia, the value of national safety was emphasized, in New Zealand, the Prime Minister focused on depicting the local political opponent as informed by falsehood regarding statements made about the compact. In the case of New Zealand, the moral principle depicted as desirable for state leadership was governance by facts, instead of decision-making based purely on emotions. The value strongly held by the PM was state sovereignty, which was consistently addressed as a central value in the GCM debates in both states.

PM Jacinda Ardern: “They [The National Party] claimed that we wouldn’t hold sovereignty over our own borders - that was totally factually incorrect and remains incorrect. We would never sign away the sovereignty of the maintenance of our own immigration policy.” (Cheng, *NZ Herald*, July 1, 2019)

Speakers who emphasized compassion and solidarity in their argumentation also appealed to their audiences by evoking positive attributes, or figures of speech that create affirmative connotations. For example, in the below extract, the general manager for migration Rachel O’Connor from the New Zealand Red Cross uses the word ‘Kiwi’ to refer to New Zealanders as unified, humane, and well-intentioned people who are capable of expressing empathy.

“we know Kiwis on the whole care about ensuring all people who are migrating have access to humanitarian assistance, protection, health care and basic services.” (Rachel O’Connor, the New Zealand Red Cross. In Ensor, www.newshub.co.nz, December 20, 2018)

To a notable extent, the debates on the compact with regards to humane migration governance became simultaneously debates about being associated with the ‘right group’; opposers referred to

political allies who were also withdrawing from the compact, whilst supporters accused such aligning of reflecting far-right political sentiments. The latter portrays a starkly articulated moral principle about what kind of political association is deemed as appropriate for politicians and decisionmakers.

" 'Why do you think we can do this alone?' Dann asked. 'The only people who are really going alone on this one are the United States who are building a border wall, Australia which has got off shore detention centres, why do we want to be associated with those sorts of policies?' " (Corin Dann, 1 NEWS. In tvnz.co.nz, December 17, 2018)

"The other countries that have refused to sign this compact are, you know, the US, some fairly far-right regimes in parts of Europe. It's a pretty nationalist position that's being held here by the government, and I'm not at all comfortable with it." (Emma Dawson, Executive Director of Per Capita. The Drum, in abc.net.au, November 21, 2018)

Overall, speakers articulating that the GCM makes migration governance more humane and coordinated used the same value of human rights as did some of the speakers opposing the compact. They also had to refer to the value of state sovereignty to portray an understanding of the fact that the general public following the media appreciates and respects the value of the sovereign state. Additionally, the speakers would use 'soft' values, such as compassion and solidarity, in order to appeal to the moral sentiments of their audiences. The moral principle of the primacy of complying with international human rights norms was portrayed as more desirable than allying with countries that have notoriously strict border protection policies and politically conservative governments.

What the speakers often omitted from their argumentation were aspects related to how, concretely, would the compact improve national migration governance and cooperation with other states. The argumentation stayed on a relatively abstract level, focusing on the general principles and values under which the compact had been created. The speakers also centered on the domestic political context, focusing either on current controversial local policies or on depicting political opponents as incoherent in their presentation.

4.4. The GCM is not legally binding – but still binding?

Both opposing and supporting views on the migration compact also relied on reasoning drawing from the legally non-binding nature of the GCM. Opposers depicted themselves as sceptics with regard to the non-binding nature of the compact, centering their concern on the notion that the GCM poses political and moral obligation for states to comply with it. Supporters emphasized that the GCM respects the sovereignty of nation-states and does not pose any new legal obligations. The compact

was addressed by supporters in the light of the benefits it could yield and the human rights it aims to protect. Sceptic speakers used different rhetorical means, such as sarcasm to show that the compact does have some binding force.

“In any event, who would have thought that a compact comprising 34 pages, 54 paragraphs, and 16,603 words which provides that the UN ‘will review the progress made at local, national, regional and global levels’ was anything other than aspirational?” (The Mocker, *The Australian*, August 2, 2018)

“Peters [Minister of Foreign Affairs] said while it was not a binding agreement, there could eventually be pressure to treat it as binding. . . . ‘In terms of morale and in terms of integrity, non-binding sometimes means binding. Why would a first-world country in a democracy sign something with no intention of abiding by it?’ ” (Cheng, NZ Herald, December 4, 2018)

In the latter extract, the New Zealand Minister for Foreign Affairs Winston Peters uses comparison to illustrate that the GCM case is also a matter of rational governance; the concept “first-world” is used to indicate a desirable state of national affairs, as opposed to being a country without ‘first-world qualities’. The concept is also used to evoke positive attributes related to modernity, such as progression. In this statement, considered governance and accountability are associated with attributes of the first-world. Democracy is also used by the Minister as a highly regarded value since it is mentioned in the context of first-world characteristics. “Morale” and “integrity” are also choices of diction that portray the government as carefully and ethically considering its decision over the GCM matter.

To illustrate their point, opposers in Australia and New Zealand would often point towards previous UN declarations that were also non-legally binding, but still had had a tangible effect on domestic policymaking. This rhetorical approach was firmly rooted on the value of state sovereignty; speakers would accentuate that the UN should not be a legitimate actor to interfere with domestic migration policymaking – or with other domestic policy fields, for that matter.

“Of course, now that we’re refusing to sign it, the usual suspects are out saying: ‘Well, what’s the problem? It’s non-binding anyway, it really doesn’t mean anything.’ That, of course, is exactly why it should be rejected. Because if it doesn’t mean anything, why sign it? And when we’re told that the Paris agreement, too, was non-binding, and look what it’s done to Australia’s energy prices and our once reliable electricity grid.” (Peta Credlin, SKY News host. In www.news.com.au, November 21, 2018)

“I just don’t think we should be handing over, even though it’s non-binding - and with all due respect, that’s a misnomer; there are a whole lot of things that are non-binding

as far as UN treaties are concerned, but we still follow them - and to hand over your immigration policy to scrutiny to other UN countries if you don't do what is required - which is pretty much open borders - I think's the wrong thing to do." (Gerry Brownlee, National Party MP. In Satherley, newshub.co.nz, December 21, 2018)

These quotes portray a strong sense of what should be morally justified to expect from state leadership; accountability, and the principle of protecting national sovereignty. Comparisons are used to depict how previous UN agreements have affected the national political and economic landscape. In the first extract, the commentator is a news host for SKY News, an Australian TV channel known for its politically right-leaning content and its "Foxification" (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 May, 2019). The speaker is aware of the audience of the news channel, which influences the choice of diction and tone for the applied rhetoric. In the latter extract, the usage of the expression "to hand over" creates a sense of unreasonable governance; if the government would choose to endorse the GCM, the state would voluntarily give up some of its decision-making force, which is not portrayed as desirable. The speaker also uses an explicit, direct statement "I think's the wrong thing to do" to mark what is considered as morally unacceptable from the government; to comply with UN agreements that might weaken the sovereign decision-making power of the state. As a member of the main opponent party in the parliament, the speaker in the latter extract has a distinct political interest of challenging the leadership behavior incorporated by the ruling government.

For supporters of the compact, the appeal to the non-legally binding nature of the GCM was utilized to abrogate concerns about how the states would be required to comply with the GCM if it was locally endorsed. However, they also used other values with this line of argument, such as efficient governance and universal human rights. It was also expressed as a strong moral principle that decisionmakers should base their decisions on evidence, instead of rumors or fear.

"Unfortunately, whether we sign up to a convention or a pact, doesn't make it automatically legally binding. So, I think rather than, again, perpetuate fear around these issues and continue to perpetuate the myth-making, can we please really do some fact-checking and also have a more evidence-based approach? I think that's very reasonable to expect." (Aisha Novakovich, CEO of Modest Fashion Australia. The Drum, in www.abc.net.au, November 21, 2018)

The degree to which the compact is binding was also addressed by the NGO sector. The value of state sovereignty was notably evoked, alongside with other speakers referring to the compact as not posing any new legal obligations. For example, in the below extract, the chief executive of Refugees as Survivors in New Zealand comments:

"Ms Hood says there's no need to worry about it compromising our own laws. 'It's pretty clear that it's not legally binding and that it's not enforceable domestically, and

that we won't be compromised.' " (Ann Hood, Refugees as Survivors. In newshub.co.nz, December 20, 2018)

In the statement, the speaker uses the expression "pretty clear" to establish a sense of self-evidence; there should be no need to doubt the non-legally binding nature of the migration compact. The use of negation is repeated several times to downplay the sense of threat created by some sceptic arguments about the bindingness of the compact. The value of state sovereignty is used together with the value of national identity, as shown in the usage of the pronoun "we" to refer to a nation that the members of the audience are expected to identify with. As the chief executive works for an organization that supports refugees, it shows professional integrity to be in favor of a compact that addresses ways of governing migration in a more efficient and humane way.

The issue of what it means to have a 'non-binding' agreement was notably discussed in the analyzed news media in both countries. Different values were associated with this line of argumentation, depending on whether the approach was in support of or against the compact. However, many values were commonly shared and similar among various arguments. The moral principles expressed were mainly focused on two aspects. One was centered on highlighting the responsibility of state leaders to exercise professional integrity; to only sign on to agreements that one fully agrees with and to ensure that the decisions of state leaders do not threaten national sovereignty, domestic legislation, and domestic policymaking. Supporters of the compact accentuated that it is the moral responsibility of leaders to respect human rights and to express compassion and solidarity over fear, whilst working towards more safe, efficient, and humane approaches for migration governance.

Overall, local epistemic struggles emerged as various actors participated in the domestication of the GCM, choosing from a largely shared pool of values and moral principles to give one's argument more persuasive weight. However, these values and moral principles were used differently depending on one's intended audience and underlying interests for participating in the GCM debates. As it was not only politicians, but also reporters, media channel hosts, columnists, foreign experts, ordinary citizens, other local public figures, different institutes, and non-governmental organizations that took part in the public mediation about adopting the compact, the decoupling of the GCM - the delay in the process from publishing the final draft to implementing it in domestic contexts - became inevitable.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

This thesis has shifted attention from material resources of governance to cultural conceptions that have the capacity to influence how the United Nations Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration becomes perceived. This is a relevant aspect to consider, as cultural understandings of

morale among the local publics affect the implementation of the GCM. This approach redirects our focus to the fact that formulating 'state interests' is a dynamic process in democratically led nation-states; these dynamics show how actors construct 'problems' that need the problem-solving attention of decision-makers (Sylväterä 2016, 44).

The data analysis showed how various actors participated in the national GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand. These actors shared similar kinds of moral rhetoric in both states. Although they represented their own background institutions and entered the debates with their own agendas, they needed to appear as legitimate in the eyes of others. This was done by constructing arguments that utilized commonly shared values and universal understandings of morality. This setting led to local epistemic struggles about the significance of adopting and complying with the GCM. Due to such dynamics between a plurality of actors, the migration compact became disputed, leading to an arduous domestication process and, ultimately, to its decoupling.

It is universally considered as legitimate to support human rights and state sovereignty; both values resonate with large audiences around the world. Due to both values being highly institutionalized in the world polity, some actors struggled to balance between the opponents and supporters of the GCM in the domestic debates in Australia and New Zealand. They needed to find a way to evoke both values in a way that supported their own agendas as well as appealed to their intended audiences. The government of New Zealand, for example, had to delay its process with the GCM due to expressed public concerns of whether the GCM hinders national sovereignty. Whether this scenario was ever truly considered as a real threat by the speakers, the government, nevertheless, had to take it seriously because the value of state sovereignty weighs heavily in world culture. In order to appear as considered leaders who work for the best interests of the nation, the Labour-led government asked guidance from the Crown Law Office. This move provided more legitimation for the government's final decision. This way, the government could adopt the compact with a human rights lens, whilst having had addressed the question of national security and sovereignty.

Sinclair (2012, 155) talks about "rejectionism": a phenomenon by which actors object to the very idea of global governance because it is perceived to harm state sovereignty and to compromise the interests of the nation-state. He has written:

"This purpose is utopian in character, harking back to some mythical time when the country did not need others, but stood up for itself and acted confidently. In this sense Rejectionism's agenda is nostalgic, anti-modern and fundamentally conservative."
(ibid.)

Sinclair discusses such objection towards global governance as a "small-town view of the world" (ibid.). Nowadays, particularly in terms of global migration issues, such a view has become more mainstream in domestic policymaking around the world. The views expressed by state leaders and

other speakers in the analyzed news media in Australia and New Zealand show that to be critical of global governance is a legitimate way to address societal issues in the wider public. Furthermore, Sinclair has contended that such disposition reflects a sentiment of anti-modernism. However, as shown by the moral rhetoric in the GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand, values of modernity, such as democracy and human rights, were actively used by opposers of the migration compact. Critical voices used concepts such as “first-world country” to not appear as backward or irrational.

Such ‘contradiction’ may be explained by the theory of a world culture, which highlights institutional global isomorphism as a product of conformity; different actors aspire to appear as rational, as they are guided by common world cultural principles. However, conformity does not always mean that world models become locally adopted, as shown in the case of the GCM in Australia. Related to such instances, Meyer et al (1997, 161) have stated: “Explicit rejection of world-cultural principles sometimes occurs, particularly by nationalist or religious movements whose purported opposition to modernity is seen as a threat to geopolitical stability.” However, as has been shown in this thesis, movements that reject world models often derive their rhetorical force from world-cultural conceptions of rationality and moral behavior; thus, in their opposition to a world model, actors still conform to shared norms of a world culture (ibid.).

What caused inconsistencies and disputes in the domestic GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand, *inter alia*, was the fact that “legitimated actorhood operates at several levels (national, organizational or group, and individual) that partially compete with one another” (Meyer et al. 1997, 168). It is expected behavior from state leaders to attend to the policymaking pertinent to global governance. It is also just as expected of state leaders to attend to domestic needs and concerns, even when these contradict with globally stipulated agreements. In the case of the GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand, such differing expectations for state actorhood at the global and local level caused contradictions, with which some actors struggled more than others in their positioning with the GCM matter.

Scholars applying the theoretical approach of world culture have noticed that in their eagerness to appear as rational and conforming to global policy trends, states adopt policy models that are sometimes ill-suited to their domestic contexts (Alasuutari 2015, 5). However, the GCM debates in Australia and New Zealand draw our attention to a form of decoupling that is less highlighted within world culture literature; a phenomenon of industrially affluent states with a suitable infrastructure struggling or entirely failing to accommodate a world model. Decoupling is often discussed with examples that derive from economically poor societies (for reference, see Meyer et al. 1997, 155). However, this thesis empirically shows that decoupling is not contained to developing nation-states struggling to accommodate global policy trends due to inadequate resources. Decoupling also pertains to industrialized states struggling to implement the policies that they have formally

committed to. In the case of the GCM in Australia and New Zealand, the struggle has been more of a rhetorical nature, evoking competing cultural conceptions, rather than being a question of material resources for policy implementation.

As the data shows, some actors struggled more than others at the crossroads of different world cultural values. The Labor Party in Australia and the National Party in New Zealand, for example, had their own struggles with the expectations of maintaining professional integrity and political image, while encountering the pressures of their domestic sociopolitical realities. It is notable that the opposition parties in both states used many similar moral principles and values as their governments when addressing the GCM. These shared moral principles included, *inter alia*, that state leaders should work for the best interests of their nation, decision-makers need to base their decisions on rationality and reason, human rights need to be respected, and the state should have the sovereign right to determine how to do its own policymaking.

The local GCM discussions were also characterized by the entering of various other voices besides those of political parties and the government. Actors such as journalists, columnists, media channel hosts, NGOs and charity organizations, foreign commentators with notable international reputation, ordinary citizens, personnel from different universities, and representatives of various institutes were given space to express their opinions on the GCM. All these actors participated in setting the tone for the local GCM discussions. Even though it is the government that makes the final decision, it is unavoidably influenced by the existence of the news media and the public tone in which societal issues are largely discussed. Such a plurality of actors participating in the domestication of the GCM made the whole process evermore intensive and unstable.

Interestingly, many actors expressed similar kinds of moral rhetoric in their reasoning about the migration compact. This is an apparent example of the influence of globalization, and the role of the media. The concerns revolving around the migration compact initially sparked from the United States as the Trump administration withdrew from the GCM process in 2017. Such concerns spread to the other side of the globe, with other states articulating similar kinds of worries. This would also suggest that actors do, to some degree, perceive the larger world polity around them in standardized and shared conceptualizations. This is reflected in the similarities of the moral rhetoric deployed in Australia and New Zealand and elsewhere in the world. For example, in their attempt to be anti-globalist, opposing voices domesticate the GCM in very similar ways, being under the influence of globalization and the news they hear from other regions. Similarly, supporters of the migration compact also appear to speak in one voice, despite being located in different geographical locations.

What is notable is the fluidity of the domestication process, especially in the case of the GCM. Even when the decision to endorse or reject the compact had been made, the decision was still further deliberated and challenged, as shown by the example of the National Party in New Zealand. In

Australia, The Labor Party was also portrayed by the news media as having the potential to turn the government's decision over if the party would be successful in the next elections. In both cases, the state-led decision is considered to be unstable and subject to potential changes under a different government. In other words; democratic processes entail a decoupling force.

Some actors appeared quite explicit with their intentions in the domestication process. Journalists, for example, write from the viewpoint of their readership, and with the aim of maintaining and increasing subscription volumes. Politicians, naturally, have the background interest of maintaining and obtaining political power. However, it is perhaps slightly more unclear to come to a conclusion of the main interests for foreign experts to enter a domestic debate about whether a national government should adopt a global policy instrument.

In previous domestication research it has been shown that actors might refer to external sources to obtain more argumentative credibility – to have more “epistemic capital” (Alasuutari 2018) in their reasoning. However, what is perhaps less addressed in this context is the role of foreign experts themselves participating in domestication processes. For example, there were voices external to the domestic field articulating opinions about the GCM in the analyzed Australian news media. These foreign visitors voiced out a public opinion from a position of high professional merit. Why would the Australian news media interview a foreign expert to comment on the governmental stand? Perhaps, this could be viewed as a way to ‘challenge’ the global community; a foreign voice might be used to seek further validation for the national decision. This question remains unanswered in this thesis, but it has brought an interesting aspect for the theoretical conceptualizations of domestication processes.

It is axiomatic that the value of state sovereignty is significant in arguments concerning national migration policymaking. This was visible in the arguments regarding the migration compact, whether in support of or starkly against it. It is commonsensical that global occurrences are reflected upon by observing and conceptualizing them with localized identifications; through what is already close and familiar to us. Accordingly, this thesis has shown how nation-states are a highly institutionalized and naturalized social construct; the world as organized into clearly demarcated nation-states has become so evident to us that we go by without questioning their existence. We identify with national identities, and the national identification is expected to be greatly valued. By automation, speakers will refer to “we” as a common nation, because they recognize it as self-evident that their audiences will understand and identify with the pronoun. This was an expected finding from the data, but it reaffirms that as a deeply naturalized and legitimized social construct, both parties - the opposers and the supporters - attempted to utilize the value of the nation-state in different ways to build more credibility for their arguments.

The self-evidence of the nation-state makes domesticating global models ‘naturally occurring’, meaning that actors might barely notice how different world models become entwined into the local reality. However, the more sensitive the issue in question, the more arduous the domestication process might be. Contrasting the global with the local might turn into a rhetorical tactic used by actors participating in the domestication process; the item in question might be rejected precisely because it is viewed as something external, as something that should not be accepted to amalgamate into the domestic context. However, the domestication process already starts when actors construct a national interest around a world model. In this thesis, it is shown in the way actors for and against the compact associated various future scenarios to the GCM from the viewpoint of locally lived experiences.

Alasuutari and Qadir (2014, 14) acknowledge that their model on the stages of domestication is simplified for the purposes of clarifying its basic idea. It would otherwise seem that the stages of domestication appear as ‘clear-cut’ which cannot be the case with complex social phenomena. Domestication can be very fluid, adaptive, and unstable. The item that becomes domesticated might be rejected by local audiences, the process could stagnate and be reactivated by local events, the decisions made are not set in stone, and the development may go back and forth. In the context of New Zealand, the beginning of the transition process from domestic debates to naturalization by nationalization seems arduous, and not least because of the dark and heavy imprint left on the GCM by the Christchurch terror attacks in March 2019. One may view this as a form of negative domestication, as an extreme example of constructing a localized interest around a global policy model. It is left to be seen whether the “naturalization” of the compact will ever fully occur in New Zealand, or whether the GCM becomes domesticated ‘only’ to the level of public controversy over immigration issues.

Domestication is still a theoretical orientation under the process of more refinement (Qadir 2014, 149). Something domestication studies might find useful to explore further are the “in-between-stages” in the processes of domestication. Even though it is acknowledged that the processes of domestication are not as clear-cut as theoretically portrayed, more research could be conducted to explore the more ‘deviant’ examples of domestication; for example, world models that have spread to many regions in the world, but which are simultaneously marked by controversy in local contexts. What kind of local dynamics eject the pressure to conform to global policy trends?

Another aspect to examine further from a world-cultural perspective are the dynamics that are present when the implementation of a particular model is actually negotiated and debated in the local context. How do different actors negotiate about the implementation of a particular policy model? Studying such negotiation processes through the lens of domestication could provide more insights about the dynamics that influence the events occurring in the world polity.

What the thesis has shown is that domestication does not always entail a 'blurring' of a global origin to the background as part of a fine-grained development where the 'global' insidiously entwines into national discourses. On the contrary, depending on the issue under debate, the global origin of a model might be highlighted particularly as a reason for why it should be rejected in the first place. In the case of the GCM, this has happened by means of emphasizing local uniqueness and a strong sense of national agency, detectable in the arguments that concentrate on protecting state sovereignty. When Australia rejected the compact, it was because the GCM was perceived as not adding anything to its already existing immigration policies, which were highlighted as successful and efficient. Similarly, the National Party in New Zealand also mentioned that the domestic immigration policies were already sufficient and, therefore, the migration compact was not needed.

A limitation to this thesis is the omission of some of the major newspapers read in both states, as only one newspaper per country was chosen. However, the main focus of the thesis was not to provide a generalizable overview of the GCM media discourses in both country contexts, but to investigate the value-laden argumentation present in the mass news media of Australia and New Zealand. Alasuutari (2013, 105) reminds that qualitative research is not intended to be generalized upon large populations; to be able to indicate the existence of particular kinds of dynamics in a specific case indicates not their universality, but their probability (*ibid.*).

This thesis aimed at answering the following research problem: if modern nation-states share similar understandings about how migration should be governed, then why would some states withdraw from the GCM, which is a non-legally binding policy instrument? And why is the necessity of the compact also debated in states that finally choose to endorse it? This thesis has shown that although actors shared similar values and moral principles when they argued about the potential national repercussions of adopting the GCM, they used such values and moral principles to legitimize their arguments, whilst attending to their own distinct interests. This needed to be done in a way that made the actors appear as credible; thus, the GCM became entwined into local contexts through a process of domestication and epistemic struggles. Being non-legally binding leaved room for different actors to construct various meanings for the GCM in a way that they considered to appeal to their audiences. The spread of world cultural values, such as rationality, is also visible in the data. Although actors engaged in the debates in two different countries, they shared similar moral rhetoric and argumentation about the GCM. Rationality in the form of considered governance was one clear example of a value that was utilized by actors in both country contexts.

In terms of future research, it would be insightful to investigate how different actors negotiate about implementing a global policy model. This thesis focused on a non-legally binding framework; however, local political disputes may also emerge in the context of legally binding international agreements. Investigating how actors in the local context negotiate about reaching particular aims

of specific binding agreements may further enhance our understanding of domestication processes. Additionally, this study focused on the initial stages of domestication. However, if Australia and New Zealand would have already progressed to the negotiation phases about how to implement the GCM, it would have been interesting to attend to such deliberation dynamics from a world cultural perspective. Furthermore, it would yield insightful observations to study the visual rhetoric utilized in domestication and epistemic governance. Initially, I intended to research the visual imagery of social media posts made by different parties with regard to the migration compact. However, the GCM had not been addressed much in mainstream political social media posts in Australia and New Zealand. Therefore, studying visual rhetoric and the ways this plays a role in domestication was not chosen for this study. Studying visual rhetoric in domestication and epistemic governance is a gap for future domestication research to fill.

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